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REGULATING CORPORATE VENTURE 
CAPITAL 
Jennifer S. Fan* 
Sesame Street, Walgreens, 7-Eleven, General Motors, 
Campbell Soup—these are not the names of companies that 
come to mind when thinking about the startup world. Yet, 
each of these companies started its own corporate venture 
capital arm in the last eight years. Corporate venture capital 
(“CVC”)—equity investments in external startups made by 
corporations or investment entities designated by 
corporations—no longer play a minor role in venture capital; 
they have become an influential force in the field. Business 
scholars have been at the forefront of studying this newly 
powerful phenomenon. Thus far, however, legal scholars have 
overlooked CVCs. Legal scholars—and many in the venture 
capital community—see only two players: traditional venture 
capital firms and entrepreneurs. The failure to appreciate the 
significance of CVCs as a third major player impoverishes 
theoretical and practical accounts of venture capital. This 
Article reframes the legal discussion of venture capital to 
incorporate key shifts wrought by CVCs in areas from 
corporate governance to risk allocation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Household names like Sesame Street,1 Walgreens,2 7-
Eleven,3 General Motors,4 and Campbell Soup5 have joined 
 
1 See Matthew Lynley, Yep, Sesame Street Now has a Venture Fund, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 1, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2016/02/01/yep-sesame-
street-now-has-a-venture-fund/ [perma.cc/5NF7-6R4U].  
2 See discussion infra Section III.D and accompanying notes. 
3 7-Eleven’s corporate venture capital arm, 7-Ventures, began in 2010 
and focuses on investments in the software industry. See 7-Ventures, 
PITCHBOOK, https://my.pitchbook.com/#page/profile_1884716116/ 
[perma.cc/HUW4-97NE]. 
4 General Motors invests directly in startups as well as through its 
corporate venture capital arm, General Motors Ventures, which was 
formed in 2010. See discussion infra Section III.E and accompanying 
notes.  
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the ranks of high tech titans such as Google and Intel in the 
world of corporate venture capital (“CVC” or “corporate 
venture capital”). In contrast to venture capital (“VC” or 
“venture capital”) firms which purely focus on financial 
returns, most corporations seek strategic benefits from their 
venture investments, in addition to financial returns.”6 
Although CVC started in the 1960s and experienced four 
periods or “waves” of development, only in the past few years 
has it matured into a major force, finding a central place in 
the fast–evolving technology landscape that focuses on 
disruptive innovation.7 CVC now permeates every stage of 
venture capital. In the race to remain innovative, larger 
corporations engage in CVC endeavors to associate with and 
profit from the next market disrupters.  
CVCs are not mere analogs of traditional VC firms. As a 
result of their position within larger corporations, CVCs 
have different strategic goals and unparalleled financial and 
 
5 Campbell Soup’s newly-created venture arm (founded in 2016) is 
called Acre Venture Partners. See discussion infra Subsection III.C.3 and 
accompanying notes. 
6 Equity, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., 
http://www.kauffman.org/microsites/state-of-the-field/topics/finance/equity 
[perma.cc/WVU6-BLW6]; see also VOLANS & GLOBAL CORP. VENTURING, 
INVESTING IN BREAKTHROUGH: CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL 9 (2014), 
http://www.breakthroughcapitalism.com/files/volans-investing-
breakthrough-report.pdf [perma.cc/USP6-8NFT]. This differs from the goal 
of venture capital funds, which aim to get extremely high returns (i.e. 
homeruns) on investments made on behalf of limited partners who invest 
in venture capital funds. See BRAD FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE 
DEALS 115–28 (2d ed. 2013). “[CVC] is a subset of venture capital wherein 
corporations make systematic investments into startup companies, often 
by taking an equity stake in an innovative firm tangentially related to the 
company’s own industry. They often also provide marketing expertise, 
management, strategic direction, and a line of credit.” Jack Du, The Rise of 
Corporate Venture Capital (TWTR, FB), INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/082815/rise-corporate-
venture-capital.asp [perma.cc/4C5A-Q7W2]. 
7 Clayton Christensen coined the term “disruptive innovation.” Joseph 
L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Innovation: Catching the 
Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 1995, at 45. See also infra note 74 (for a full 
definition of disruptive innovation).  
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technical resources from which entrepreneurs can 
immensely benefit. These distinctions raise significant 
business and legal issues. Thus far, however, legal scholars 
have overlooked CVCs. This Article is the first to analyze 
how CVC has fundamentally altered legal considerations 
related to private ordering8 in the venture capital world.9  
CVC had a banner year in 2015,10 accounting for twenty-
five percent of later stage deals globally.11 CVCs poured in 
roughly $7.7 billion in 930 venture rounds that equated to 
twenty-one percent of all deals and thirteen percent of all 
venture capital dollars.12 The sectors benefitting the most 
from this influx of money were software companies,13 
 
8 Private ordering is defined as “where transactors are autonomous 
and employ extralegal mechanisms to enforce contracts . . . .” Barak D. 
Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive 
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2330 (2004). 
9 See discussion infra Section II.D for a more robust definition of 
private ordering within the context of venture capitalism. 
10 Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Corporate Venture 
Investment to Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Hits Fifteen Year High in 2015 
(Jan. 19, 2016), http://nvca.org/pressreleases/corporate-venture-
investment-to-entrepreneurial-ecosystem-hits-fifteen-year-high-in-2015/ 
[perma.cc/XJA6-LNJ6] [hereinafter NVCA, Corporate Venture Investment 
Hits Fifteen Year High]. 
11 Rachael King, Corporate VC Investments Hold Steady amid 
Broader Downturn in Market, WALL ST. J.: CIO J. (Jan. 22, 2016, 5:45 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/01/22/corporate-vc-investments-hold-steady-
amid-broader-downturn-in-market/ [perma.cc/B257-REA3]. 
12 See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2016 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL 
ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 94 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 NVCA YEARBOOK]. In 
light of the increasing number of corporations starting CVCs, the authors 
of the 2016 NVCA YEARBOOK note that corporate venture groups will 
continue to invest alongside venture capital funds. See id.; see also NVCA, 
Corporate Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High, supra note 10. In 
the fourth quarter of 2015 alone, investment from corporate venture 
capital amounted to “$1.2 billion in 199 deals, representing 10.3 percent of 
dollars invested and 21 percent of deals for the quarter.” Id. 
13 “As has been the trend with overall venture investing, software 
companies continue to receive the largest amount of corporate venture 
dollars, drawing $2.5 billion in 389 deals in 2015, representing 32.6 
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biotechnology companies,14 and industrial/energy 
companies.15  
CVCs have existed since the 1960s, but in a less 
influential, embryonic, form.16 In their earlier stages of 
development, CVCs tended to invest only in the later stages 
of startups, and generally did not designate board members. 
Now the opposite is true: corporations increasingly make 
investments in the early stages of startups through their 
 
percent of all corporate venture dollars deployed.” NVCA, Corporate 
Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High, supra note 10. 
14 In the biotechnology sector, CVCs deployed $1.2 billion in 133 
deals, which amounted to 16.3 percent of all CVC dollars in 2015. Id. To 
highlight one example, with respect to cancer startups, “[e]xcept for a drop 
in funding in 2012 (consistent with overall funding trends to this sector 
that year), funding dollars from rounds involving corporate investors—
including corporate parents and differentiated venture arms—increased 
nearly five-fold, from $259M in 2011 to $1.24B in 2015.” Corporate Deal 
Activity in Cancer Therapeutics Startups Nearly Doubles in 2015, CB 
INSIGHTS (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/corporate-
investors-oncology-startups/ [perma.cc/SA4Z-H2BF]. 
15 In the industrial/energy sector, CVCs deployed $1.2 billion in forty-
six deals which amounted to 16.1% of all CVC dollars and nearly forty 
percent of all venture investments in this sector in 2015. NVCA, Corporate 
Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High, supra note 10. “[C]orporate 
venture investment in industrial/energy companies continued to be over-
weighted as compared to overall venture investment into the sector. In 
2015, corporate venture groups accounted for nearly forty percent of all 
venture investment into industrial/energy companies.” Id. 
16 In 1968 to 1969, there were 150 CVC units but by 1973 only ten 
remained. There were similar downturns in the 1980s and 1999/2000. Josh 
Lerner, Professor, Harvard Bus. School, Discussion with Fan Munce at the 
SHIFT NYC Conference (Oct. 28, 2016), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/corporates-shift-relations-vcs-james-
mawson [perma.cc/6KBB-79ED]. Coupled with the rise of CVC is the fact 
that the VC industry has consolidated. “211 U.S. firms [did] at least five 
deals in a year . . . versus 1,000 or more in 2000. . . . 60% of [venture 
capital] money [is] now raised in funds being secured by the top 16 firms.” 
Venky Ganesan, Chairman, NVCA, Remarks at the SHIFT NYC 
Conference (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/corporates-
shift-relations-vcs-james-mawson [perma.cc/6KBB-79ED]. 
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CVCs,17 and CVCs frequently designate board members, 
heavily influencing all stages of startups receiving CVC.  
CVCs are developing their own investment rhythm—one 
that differs significantly from that of VC funds. Additionally, 
CVCs are now investing in a broader spectrum of industries 
and the parent corporations of CVCs are reallocating funds 
from research and development (“R&D”) to CVC activities. In 
fact, CVC augments and may eventually supplant R&D due 
to its increasing reach and influence. Corporate venture 
capital is now a mature economic force, and it is already 
changing things on the ground. Put simply, CVC is now a 
major player in the innovation ecosystem. 
The legal implications of CVC with respect to private 
ordering have yet to be explored. In the past, legal 
scholarship has focused on the role of entrepreneurs and 
venture capital funds (and the limited partners who invest in 
them). With the swell of CVC activity, however, the 
dynamics of the private ordering system which undergirds 
the venture capital landscape has changed. While legal 
scholars have written extensively about venture capital, they 
have overlooked this shift. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the 
evolution of CVC. Part II briefly describes how private 
ordering works within the venture capital context when only 
startups and venture capital funds are involved. It then 
analyzes the growing role and importance of CVC and its 
impact on the implicit and explicit contracts made between 
the startup and venture capital fund. Part III critiques the 
legal issues raised by the increasing influence of CVC on 
venture capital using a few prominent public companies with 
CVC arms as examples. Part IV suggests possible solutions 
to the challenges raised by CVCs in private ordering in the 
venture capital context; specifically, the ramifications of CVC 
investments for early investors (i.e., venture capital funds), 
 
17 See CB INSIGHTS, THE 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT 13 (2017), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-corporate-venture-capital-report-
2016 [hereinafter 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT] (registration required). 
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employees of the startups, and founders. This Article 
concludes with suggestions for future areas of study. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE VENTURE 
CAPITAL: THE FOUR WAVES 
Corporate venture capital has matured and evolved over 
the course of a few decades. In its latest iteration, it has 
become a fixture in the VC landscape, and is now a major 
player in what historically has been a two-player private 
ordering world. To provide context, this Article briefly 
discusses the first three eras—called waves—of corporate 
venture capital. It then argues how the current wave, the 
fourth, marks the maturation of this new form of investment. 
The evolution of corporate venture capital can be tied to 
four distinct time periods, or waves.18 The first wave took 
place in the 1960s and was concentrated in the areas of 
technology and pharmaceuticals.19 When the initial public 
 
18 There is no substantive or authoritative research about the origins 
of CVCs. It is difficult to pinpoint the number of CVCs in earlier waves. In 
the first wave, “[t]he prevailing spirit of American big business . . . favored 
large diversified corporations operating in many sectors.” The History of 
CVC: From Exxon and DuPont to Xerox and Microsoft, How Corporates 
Began Chasing ‘The Future’, CB INSIGHTS (Mar 7, 2017), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/corporate-venture-capital-
history/ [perma.cc/PZ5X-EQ5E] [hereinafter The History of CVC].  
19 VOLANS & GLOBAL CORP. VENTURING, supra note 6, at 20. The 
traditional venture capital model drove the success of the first CVC wave, 
and, “as corporations grew in size and scope in the 1960s, a need to 
diversify. They focused on internal ventures or external [startups]; the 
emergence of spin-out businesses benefiting from wider parent company 
support was yet to come. The activity was mainly in innovation-intensive 
industries such as technology and pharmaceuticals.” Id. In the mid-1960s, 
corporations entered the venturing world with the goal of “generating 
above-average financial returns.” Falk Bielesch et al., Corporate Venture 
Capital: Avoid the Risk, Miss the Rewards, BCG PERSPECTIVES (Oct. 31, 
2012), https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/innovation_ 
growth_mergers_acquisitions_corporate_venture_capital/ [perma.cc/ 
4WVM-N85P]. “It was a period of rapid technological advancement, robust 
corporate profits, a soaring stock market, and widespread management 
faith in the strategic value of diversification.” Id. U.S. corporations in the 
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offering (“IPO”) market collapsed and the oil crisis emerged 
in the 1970s, the first wave ended.20 The second wave 
occurred in the 1980s when venture capitalists re-emerged 
due to less stringent pension fund regulations and tax cuts.21 
Biotechnology and technology companies received the bulk of 
the investments in that time period until the market 
downturn in 1987.22 The third wave took place during the 
dot-com boom in the late 1990s—CVC surged again due to 
the allure of riches in the Internet realm and rising stock 
markets.23 In the early 2000s, however, the bubble burst, 
and CVC activity decreased substantially.24 These dramatic 
 
technology and pharmaceutical sectors invested in new ventures, but shut 
down their corporate venture capital arms when the initial public offering 
market collapsed in 1973. Id. 
20 Bielesch et al., supra note 19. 
21 Due to the loosening of pension fund regulations and tax cuts, 
venture capital funds re-emerged in the 1980s and CVCs followed suit, 
hoping to match the returns of traditional VC firms. Id. “CVC as a broad 
theme lay dormant until the early 1980s, when a new generation of 
independent venture capitalists emerged, their coffers bulging with cash 
from U.S. investors taking advantage of a cut in the capital gains tax and 
the relaxation of restrictions on pension fund investments.” Id. As was the 
case in the 1970s, the technology and pharmaceutical industries were the 
most active CVC investors, but when the stock market crash of 1987 
occurred, their interest faded and they “went into retreat.” Id. 
22 VOLANS & GLOBAL CORP. VENTURING, supra note 6, at 21. 
23 “The third CVC wave boomed in investment levels around the time 
of the dotcom bubble, fueled by the seemingly limitless potential of the 
Internet and rising stock markets—and fell victim to the bubble’s pop in 
the early 2000s.” Id. It also marked the first time that European 
corporations and emerging markets engaged in venture investing. Id. 
24 Id. In the late 1990s, corporations invested heavily in startups until 
the economic downturn. From September 2000 to September 2001, 
investments in startups fell by eighty percent. Henry Chesbrough, Making 
Sense of Corporate Venture Capital, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2002, at 90, 
101, https://hbr.org/2002/03/making-sense-of-corporate-venture-capital 
[perma.cc/6HX8-LJJU]. “Quarterly corporate venture-capital investments 
in [startups] rose from $468 million at the end of 1998 to $6.2 billion at the 
beginning of 2000 and then tumbled to $848 million in the third quarter of 
2001.” Id. “The advent of the Internet in the mid-1990s heralded the 
beginning of the third CVC cycle. Amid a strong market for stocks, 
especially dot-com issues, and hungry for above-market returns, 
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shifts in CVC investments contribute to the low esteem with 
which many venture capital funds hold in-house corporate 
venture capital operations. Specifically, they view public 
companies that engage in CVC as having neither the 
fortitude nor nimbleness to manage the high-risk, quick 
moving environment of venture capital investing.25 From a 
historical perspective, earlier cycles of CVC reflected the ups 
and downs of the broader economy.26 As an example, the 
absence of clear objectives and strategic focus led to the 
failure of many CVCs in the third wave.27  
Today, however, companies take proactive measures to 
address market trends by shifting their CVC investment 
priorities and partnering with ventures that can mitigate the 
risks experienced by the third wave CVCs.28 As a result, the 
modern CVC: (1) responds quickly to market 
transformations; (2) gathers intelligence on competitive 
threats; (3) allows parent companies to more easily extricate 
themselves from investments that are not advancing their 
interests (as compared to the reluctance of companies to 
abandon a languishing R&D project); (4) has a greater 
impact since CVCs are co-investing with others; (5) manages 
portfolio companies that develop technologies requiring the 
use of the parent company’s platform (as Apple did with the 
 
corporations returned in force to the game, with more than 400 of them 
worldwide launching VC programs.” Bielesch et al., supra note 19. 
European corporations and emerging markets “entered the market in 
force. CVC activity reached a high point in 2000, when corporate equity 
investments in new ventures soared to more than $4.5 billion, according 
to GCV.” Id. With the dot-com bust in 2000 and the recession of 2001 and 
2002, however, the third wave ended. Id. “In a newly risk-averse business 
environment and amid high uncertainty over new accounting and 
governance regulations, corporations wound down their VC operations.” 
Id. 
25 “In their eyes, the wild swings are further evidence that big 
companies have neither the stomach nor the agility to manage 
investments in high-risk, fast-paced environments.” Chesbrough, supra 
note 24, at 92. 
26 See VOLANS & GLOBAL CORP. VENTURING, supra note 6, at 21. 
27 See The History of CVC, supra note 18. 
28 See id. 
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iFund); and (6) allows the parent company to enjoy higher 
returns on investments.29  
Since the financial crisis in 2008, the ranks of corporate 
venture capital have swelled dramatically.30 “CVC is 
actually growing at a faster rate than venture capital 
investment in general.”31 More than 1200 corporations 
across the globe have CVC programs, of which over half were 
formed since 2010.32 Between 2012 and 2016 the number of 
active CVCs “more than doubled.”33  
As of March 2017, there were approximately 200 CVCs 
active in every quarter.34 In 2016, CVCs grew at a rate of 
twenty percent globally, with 107 new CVC funds making 
 
29 Josh Lerner, Corporate Venturing, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2013, at 
86 [hereinafter Corporate Venturing]. 
30 See Kevin Dowd, What’s Happened with the 10B+ Mega-Funds of 
2008?, PITCHBOOK (Apr. 26, 2016), http://pitchbook.com/news/articles/ 
whats-happened-with-the-10b-mega-funds-of-2008 [perma.cc/9WU8-
VAG5] (citing the financial crisis of 2008 and how the $10B+ mega-funds 
fared eight years after the crisis); The Investors Fueling the Mega-Round 
Phenomenon, CB INSIGHTS (May 16, 2016), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/hedge-mutual-funds-investing-big-deals-
tech-startups/ [perma.cc/PGQ9-AGMD]. Global corporations spend more 
than $650 billion on research and development on an annual basis 
primarily on technological advancements. Igor Sill, New Era for Corporate 
Venture Capital, ENTREPRENEUR COUNTRY GLOB. (Sept. 14, 2015), 
http://www.entrepreneurcountryglobal.com/united-kingdom/ecosystem-
economics/item/new-era-for-corporate-venture-capital/ [perma.cc/U8AH-
6DLM]. See infra Part II (discussing current state of CVC). 
31 The History of CVC, supra note 18. 
32 Press Release, DLA Piper, Corporate Venture Capital 
Compensation Report Released to Support High Performance Teams and 
Innovation Programs (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.dlapiper.com/ 
en/us/news/2016/01/corporate-vc-compensation-report-released/ [perma.cc/ 
E9TX-EAW7]. But cf. Du, supra note 6 (which states that between 2010–
2014 over 475 new CVC funds started and over 1100 are currently 
operational). The number of venture capital funds has changed 
significantly over a period of 20 years. In 1995, there were 425 venture 
capital firms; in 2005 and 2015, there were 1009 and 798 such firms, 
respectively. 2016 NVCA YEARBOOK, supra note 12. 
33 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra note 17. 
34 The History of CVC, supra note 18. 
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their first investment.35 “Companies are using CVC as a 
compelling way to drive outside-in innovation for access to 
new and disruptive technologies, the development of new 
business models and participation in emerging markets, all 
of which may provide meaningful contributions to corporate 
growth.”36 Some argue that the rise of both social media and 
the smartphone was the impetus for the resurgence of 
CVC.37 Historically low interest rates, together with the fact 
that many corporations were also sitting on large piles of 
cash, contributed to an increase in CVC as well.38 The ever-
present fear of disruption also played a role in the rise of 
CVC. The former leader of Intel Capital Corporation (“Intel 
Capital”), Arvind Sodhani, said, “CEOs who are worried 
they’re going to get disrupted want to have an outpost in 
Silicon Valley to discern where the disruption is coming 
from.”39 In stark contrast to the growth of CVC, “the VC 
industry has consolidated, with 211 U.S. firms doing at least 
five deals in a year versus 1,000 or more in 2000” and with 
“60% of money now raised in funds being secured by the top 
16 [traditional venture capital] firms.”40 
Historically, money from CVC has been invested in later 
stage funding rounds.41 Even in 2015, this continued to be 
the case, with $2.7 billion in corporate venture dollars 
allocated to later stage companies across 159 deals, 
representing nearly thirty-six percent of all such dollars.42 A 
new trend has emerged, however, as CVCs have increased 
 
35 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra note 17, at 8. 
36 Press Release, DLA Piper, supra note 32. 
37 The History of CVC, supra note 18. 
38 Id. 
39 Randall Smith, General Mills and 7-Eleven Join the Venture 
Capital Crowd, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/business/dealbook/general-mills-and-
7-elevenjoin-the-venture-capital-crowd.html/ [perma.cc/K8U3-6A76]. 
40 See Ganesan, supra note 16.  
41 See NVCA, Corporate Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High, 
supra note 10. 
42 Id. 
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their participation in early stage deals, deploying $2.4 billion 
in 442 deals in 2015.43 Although there was a marked decline 
in venture capital investing in the fourth quarter of 2015, 
corporate venture capital activity held steady, ending at 
twenty-one percent of all deals for the year.44 There were 
also a high number of initial investments—approximately 
eighty-five—made by newcomers to the corporate venture 
capital realm.45 In the fourth quarter of 2015, CVCs invested 
more money in early stage startups than in late stage 
companies.46 CVCs also invested in unicorns at a high rate.47  
In 2016, CVC investors continued to pour money into the 
market by participating in twenty-one percent of all U.S. 
venture capital-backed financings.48 The average deal size 
which included CVC participation was double that of deals 
that included only traditional venture capital firms.49 
Globally, Intel Capital and GV (formerly Google Ventures) 
 
43 Id. This represents thirty-one percent of corporate venture capital 
invested in 2015. Id. The increasing sophistication of corporate investors 
and the fact that “companies in industries that live or die by innovation, 
such as telecommunications and pharmaceutical, are increasingly eager to 
capture new ideas and thus are willing to shoulder the risk of investing in 
the dwindling number of [startups] in their sectors.” Bielesch et al., supra 
note 19. 
44 NVCA, Corporate Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High, 
supra note 10. 
45 King, supra note 11. 
46 Id. In the fourth quarter of 2015, corporate venture capitalists 
invested $650 million in ninety-eight early stage company deals, 
representing 55.7 percent of all dollars invested for the quarter. NVCA, 
Corporate Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High, supra note 10. 
Expansion stage companies received 23.4 percent of all dollars invested in 
that same quarter, deploying $273 million in fifty-six deals. Id. 
47 See ANAND SANWAL, CB INSIGHTS LIVE: STARTUPS AND ACCELERATING 
CORPORATE INNOVATION (2015), slides 70–91, 
http://www.slideshare.net/NikunjSanghvi/cb-insights-live-startups-and-
accelerating-corporate-innovation (last visited Mar. 28, 2018) (Sanwal is 
Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of CB Insights); see also 2016 
NVCA YEARBOOK, supra note 12, at 26. 
48 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra note 17, at 8. 
49 Id. at 36. 
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were the most active CVCs.50 CVC deal activity in 2016 was 
similar to 2015.51 Notably, CVC deal size from the first 
quarter of 2013 through the second quarter of 2016 was 
consistently larger than that of traditional venture capital 
firm deal sizes.52 In the fourth quarter of 2016 alone, the 
average CVC deal size reached $28 million—twice as large 
as the average VC deal size, which stood at $14 million.53 As 
a result, these large sums of money from CVCs sometimes 
contributed to skewed valuations for private companies. 
In many ways, 2017 was similar to 2016. CVC investors 
participated in approximately the same number of U.S. 
venture capital-backed financings at 847 deals.54 Intel 
Capital and GV were again the most active CVCs globally.55 
However, the average venture capital deals size increased 
slightly in 2017.56 CVC deals were, on average, $5 billion 
larger than their traditional venture capital firm 
counterpart.57 
CVCs deployed half of their corporate venture capital 
dollars to software companies ($1.2 billion) and nearly 
thirteen percent ($320 million) to biotechnology companies in 
2017.58 CVCs participated in twenty-five percent of all 
venture deals and nearly eighteen percent in the 
biotechnology company context.59 Other notable highlights 
 
50 Id. at 21. 
51 Id. at 8.  
52 Id. at 36. 
53 Id. 
54 CB INSIGHTS, THE 2017 GLOBAL CVC REPORT 6 (2018), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/reports/CB-Insights_CVC-Report-2017.pdf 
[perma.cc/4YBD-KTK9] [hereinafter 2017 GLOBAL CVC REPORT]. 
55 Id. at 16. 
56 Id. at 12. 
57 Id. 
58 Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Corporate Venture 
Engagement in Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Continues to Rise (Apr. 22, 
2016), http://nvca.org/pressreleases/corporate-venture-engagement-
entrepreneurial-ecosystem-continues-rise/ [perma.cc/G57D-RTQF] 
[hereinafter NVCA, Corporate Venture Engagement Rise]. 
59 Id.  
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include CVCs’ more active participation in the seed stage, 
and CVCs’ continued focus on early stage companies.60 CVCs 
also expanded to more industries, in many cases outside 
their core areas of expertise. As an example, the top 
corporate investors in e-commerce companies for the period 
of 2010 to August 29, 2016 were Intel Capital and GV, 
ranked at numbers one and two, respectively.61 Note, 
however, that the parent companies of each of the 
aforementioned CVC arms have historically not focused on e-
commerce.62 Intel Capital and GV, along with Motorola 
Solutions Venture Capital and Qualcomm Ventures, 
comprised the top four in terms of investments in private in-
store technology companies from the period of 2010 to 
August 4, 2016.63 The parent companies of each of these 
CVCs are not focused on in-store technology the way one 
might imagine a retail company like Walmart (which is 
ranked 46th in terms of investments in this space) would 
be.64  
Over a twenty-year period, investments by U.S.-based 
CVCs have increased seventeen-fold.65 In 2009, CVCs 
invested nearly $1.4 billion in 411 deals or 12.9 percent of all 
venture capital deals;66 2010 was much of the same with 
CVCs investing $1.8 billion in 473 deals, comprising 12.8 
percent of all venture capital deals.67 In addition to an 
increase in dollars invested, since 2011 there has also been 
an uptick in the number of deals. CVCs invested almost $2.4 
 
60 Id.  
61 Big Box vs. Big Tech: Retailers Sit on Hands when It Comes to 
Startup Bets and M&A, CB INSIGHTS (Sept. 14, 2016), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/big-retail-vs-tech-future-commerce/ 
[perma.cc/5XRC-NJ3A]. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 In 1995, there was $433 million in CVC investments. By 2015, 
CVCs invested $7.76 billion in private companies. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL 
ASS’N, Q1 2016 CORPORATE VENTURE ACTIVITY (2016) (on file with author).  
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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billion in 595 deals that equaled 14.6 percent of all venture 
capital financings.68 The increase in the number of venture 
capital financings and percent of venture capital deals with 
CVC involvement continued. Other reports note that U.S.-
based CVCs participated in 607 deals or 16.3 percent of all 
venture capital financings in 2013, 788 deals or 18.5 percent 
in 2014, 851 deals or 20 percent in 2015, 752 deals or 21 
percent in 2016,69 and 847 deals or about 20 percent in 
2017.70 The increase in deal activity and not just dollars 
invested shows greater involvement and suggests a new, 
emerging role of CVC in directing outcomes. Bobby Franklin, 
President and Chief Executive Officer of the National 
Venture Capital Association remarked on this shift in 
behavior: “[C]orporations are increasingly engaging in a 
more meaningful way with startup founders and the broader 
entrepreneurial ecosystem.”71 An increasing number of 
corporations choose to start CVCs, recognizing the 
importance of keeping up with the newest innovations. “The 
benefits of this deeper engagement accrue not only to the 
parent corporations but also the startups as they draw on 
the knowledge, expertise and networks of the parent 
corporations to scale and grow.”72 
Regarding CVC, corporations want the ability to enhance 
their R&D efforts in a nimbler way and perhaps have even 
better acquisition opportunities.73 In short, they want to be 
part of the disruptive innovation that the media, companies, 
and Wall Street all laud.74 In the past, “incumbency was the 
 
68 Id. 
69 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra note 17, at 33. 
70 See 2017 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra note 54, at 3, 9, 11. 
71 NVCA, Corporate Venture Engagement Rise, supra note 58. 
72 Id. 
73 “For the corporations, the purpose of CVCs is to increase the 
flexibility and entrepreneurial spirit of otherwise large, bureaucratic, 
multi-billion dollar companies. CVCs essentially act as a supplement to 
internal research and development. In this way, investing in small 
companies serves as a gateway for possible acquisition.” Du, supra note 6. 
74 Clayton M. Christensen et al., What Is Disruptive Innovation?, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2015, at 46, https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-
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goal. . . . Now incumbency is seen as a burden. . . . Precisely 
the organizational capabilities that underlie success in the 
industry as currently understood blind the firm to threats 
from outside of the dominant conception.”75 One might argue 
that CVC is itself disruptive.76 Additionally, public 
companies use CVC to look more closely at potential 
disruptors to their line of business. By identifying and 
holding equity in these startups, the public (parent) 
companies using CVC hope to prevent the failure of the 
 
disruptive-innovation [perma.cc/7SUA-W4EJ] (“‘Disruption’ describes a 
process whereby a smaller company with fewer resources . . . successfully 
challenge[s] established incumbent businesses. Specifically, as incumbents 
focus on improving their products and services for their most demanding 
. . . customers, they exceed the needs of some segments and ignore the 
needs of others.”). Smaller companies target overlooked segments typically 
at a lower price. Id. Incumbents don’t respond vigorously since they are 
focused on customers that will give them greater profits. Id. “Entrants 
then move upmarket, delivering the performance that incumbents’ 
mainstream customers require, while preserving the advantages that 
drove their early success. When mainstream customers start adopting the 
entrants’ offerings in volume, disruption has occurred.” Id. The authors 
also noted that disruptive innovations get started in low-end or new-
market footholds. Id. at 47. In the case of the low-end market, disrupters 
are initially focused on giving low-end customers a product that is “good 
enough.” Id. With respect to new-market footholds, disrupters figure out 
how to convert nonconsumers into consumers. Id. The authors contend 
that Uber is not a disrupter because it started off by establishing itself as 
a contender in the mainstream market and then appealed to overlooked 
markets. Id. 
75 Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical 
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 442 
(2009). 
76 “Our current belief is that companies should create a separate 
division that operates under the protection of senior leadership to explore 
and exploit a new disruptive model.” Christensen et al., supra note 74. In 
other words, perhaps the fact that public companies want to figure out a 
better way of identifying future disrupters in their respective industries or 
the next big innovation through small bets, like Alphabet does with Other 
Bets (see discussion infra Subsection III.B regarding GV and other entities 
under the banner of Other Bets) shows how leaders in public companies 
explore and exploit new, disruptive models. 
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parent company in the future.77 “The entire technology 
industry is easily disrupted, with small companies exploding 
onto the scene and overtaking giants every couple years.”78  
At first blush, it may appear that CVC is heading toward 
another boom-and-bust cycle. Yet some experts believe that 
CVC is not destined to repeat such a cycle.79 In the past, 
CVCs tended to mirror the VC investment climate.80 In this 
fourth wave of CVC, however, the numbers indicate that 
CVCs are developing their own investment rhythm 
independent of the venture capital funds.81 No longer an 
experiment, CVCs have entered a more mature chapter and 
now have a global reach.82 They are becoming more 
sophisticated and strategic as they expand to new industries, 
looking toward adjacent and downstream industries, and 
 
77 Du, supra note 6. 
78 Id. 
79 Bielesch et al., supra note 19. 
80 “In the past, corporate interest in creating venture funds tended to 
wax and wane in sync with the general VC climate. Waves of corporate 
venture activity—in the late 1960s, the mid-1980s, and the late 1990s—
corresponded with booms in VC investments and venture-backed IPOs.” 
Corporate Venturing, supra note 29, at 88. 
81 “But now we’re seeing a corporate-venturing surge even during 
lackluster days for traditional venture capital.” Id. During the global 
financial crisis, CVC funds invested more than eleven percent of the 
venture capital dollars—this was reminiscent of the amount invested by 
CVC funds during the dot-com boom. Id. “This new activity may indicate 
that as research functions face severe pressure to rein in costs and produce 
results, companies are looking for alternative means to learn and 
innovate.” Id.  
82 Corporate Venture Capital Abroad: These Are the Top CVCs in the 
UK, China, and India, CB INSIGHTS (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/top-corporate-venture-firms-uk-china-
india/ [perma.cc/K8ND-YZYL]. CVCs invest in private companies in 
countries such as China, the United Kingdom, and India. Id. For example, 
Qualcomm Ventures ranks in the top four for the three aforementioned 
markets, while Intel Capital is the top CVC investor in China and India. 
Id. 
2018.2_FAN_FINAL  
358 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
 
reallocating resources to corporate venture capital instead of 
R&D.83 
II. THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE VENTURE 
CAPITAL ON PRIVATE ORDERING IN THE 
VENTURE CAPITAL CONTEXT 
The addition of a new major player—CVC—has 
fundamentally changed the dynamics of private ordering in 
the venture capital realm. Specifically, today, there are three 
major players in venture capital: (1) the entrepreneurs who 
found the startups; (2) the venture capital funds (and the 
limited partners who fund them); and (3) CVC. CVC exerts 
its own, independent force on the innovation industry. Yet 
legal scholarship has ignored or downplayed CVC, focusing 
solely on the relationship between the first two players.84 
This Part adds CVC to the theoretical structure of venture 
capitalism and explains the broadening influence of CVC on 
private ordering. 
As Professor Ronald Gilson asserts, “[a]ll financial 
contracts respond to three central problems: uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, and opportunism in the form of 
 
83 “In many cases, they are looking past the boundaries of their own 
industries toward adjacent and downstream industries, and they are 
banding together with companies from other industries to fund promising 
new ideas.” Bielesch et al., supra note 19.  
84 See generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL 
CYCLE (2d ed. 2004); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital 
Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 
1069 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market] 
(noting that three central inputs are necessary for a venture capital 
market: capital, specialized intermediaries, and entrepreneurs). The 
intermediaries Gilson refers to are the venture capital funds through 
which institutional investors such as pension funds, banks, endowments, 
and foundations invest as passive limited partners. See id. at 1070; Steven 
N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real 
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 281 (2003). 
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agency costs.”85 In order to address these problems in the 
venture capital context, Professor Gilson identifies five 
organizational and contractual techniques: “staged 
financing, allocation of elements of control, form of 
compensation, the role of exit, and reliance on implicit 
contracts.”86 This Part shows how CVCs have developed 
their own versions of these foundational techniques, 
borrowing from traditional venture capital where helpful, 
but charting their own path in significant and influential 
ways. 
A. The Entrepreneur 
To fund an innovation, entrepreneurs need money—in 
many cases, a lot of it.87 While entrepreneurs may be able to 
secure a bank loan or debt financing for their startup, 
because of their need for significant funds, lack of 
substantial tangible assets, uncertain prospects, and the 
expectation that the startup will not turn a profit for many 
years, venture capital is frequently the more viable option.88 
By engaging in a venture capital financing, the 
entrepreneurs are selling an ownership stake in the startup 
to venture capitalists. By doing so, the company and the 
entrepreneur receive the following three things: (1) an 
explicit contract for “capital plus nonfinancial contributions 
including information, monitoring, and enhanced credibility 
with third parties,”89 (2) “an implicit incentive contract 
denominated in control,”90 and (3) “the explicit contract 
between the venture capital fund and the portfolio company 
[that] ensures that important control rights that were 
 
85 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at 
1076. 
86 Id. at 1078. 
87 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 84, at 6. 
88 Id. 
89 Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the 
Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. 
ECON. 243, 259 (1998). 
90 Id. 
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initially given to the fund . . . disappear on an initial public 
offering.”91 Put differently, the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and a venture capital fund is structured 
through management assistance (both financial and 
nonfinancial contributions), intensive monitoring and 
control, and a reputation market.92 
B. The Venture Capital Fund 
Venture capital funds raise capital from limited partners 
(i.e., passive investors) for their venture capital funds.93 A 
standard limited partnership agreement between the two 
parties sets a maximum term for the partnership of seven to 
ten years; at the end of the term, the partnership is 
liquidated.94 As part of the agreement, the limited partners 
do not have the right to approve the investment decisions 
made by the general partners, exemplifying the Berle-Means 
problem of the separation of ownership (which lies with the 
limited partner in this case) and control (which lies with the 
general partners who were not the providers of the bulk of 
 
91 Id. at 261 (these rights include guaranteed board seats and the 
ability to block certain business decisions). See also D. Gordon Smith, 
Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 134–35 (1998) (identifying the problems of 
shirking, opportunism and incompetence that entrepreneurs face when 
trying to obtain value-added services from venture capitalists). 
92 Black & Gilson, supra note 89, at 252–55. 
93 Typically, the limited partners are public employee pension funds, 
endowments, philanthropic foundations, and insurance companies, to 
name a few. Funding Innovation, NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 
http://nvca.org/ecosystem/funding-innovation/ [perma.cc/8Z8U-TDDU]. 
Traditional venture capital is what most people think of when venture 
capital is discussed—they are standalone investment entities. “Venture 
capital is financing that investors provide to startup companies and small 
businesses that are believed to have long-term growth potential.” For 
startups without access to capital markets, venture capital is an essential 
source of money. See Venture Capital, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/venturecapital.asp [perma.cc/ 
K6Z9-3KKF].  
94 Black & Gilson, supra note 89, at 256. 
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the capital).95 The general partner is typically structured as 
a company (what this Article refers to as a venture capital 
fund) owned by professional investors who decide which 
companies to invest in—typically at the early stages of the 
private company and focused on a particular sector—and 
play an active role, often times serving on the board.96 
Specifically, “[v]enture capital investors specialize in 
providing portfolio companies with a combination of financial 
capital, monitoring and advisory services, and reputational 
capital.”97 There is an implicit contract for these 
nonfinancial contributions by the venture capital funds.98 
Typically, the general partner of the fund puts in only one 
percent of the capital and the limited partners put in the 
other ninety-nine percent; however, it is the general partner 
who has complete control over the fund.99 Since the general 
partner “expects to continue in the venture capital market by 
raising successive funds after the capital in a particular fund 
has been invested in portfolio companies . . . [it] provides a 
powerful performance incentive [for the general partner].”100 
The general partner is compensated annually with a small 
management fee, which is between two to 2.5 percent of the 
committed capital.101 Assuming that its portfolio companies 
have done well, at the time that distributions are made to 
the limited partners the general partner is handsomely 
rewarded in the form of a carried interest.102  
 
95 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
96 The venture capital investors (i.e., the investment professionals at 
the venture capital firm) and the limited partners will enter into a limited 
partnership agreement. Funding Innovation, supra note 93. 
97 Black & Gilson, supra note 89, at 245. 
98 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at 
1073. 
99 Id. at 1071. 
100 Id. The general partner is already fundraising for its next fund 
during the middle of the ten-year term of a current fund. Id. 
101 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 84, at 124. 
102 Carried interest is “a share of any profits that the general partners 
of private equity and hedge funds receive as compensation, regardless of 
2018.2_FAN_FINAL  
362 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
 
A venture capital fund’s initial investment in a startup is 
not sufficient to fund the entire operations of the company 
for the duration of its existence until it is either acquired or 
goes public. Instead, the investment is staged.103 The 
venture capital fund is expected to participate in subsequent 
rounds (assuming that the company is progressing in a 
manner that the venture capital fund agrees with); however, 
it is not contractually bound to do so.104 Like the 
nonfinancial contributions, it is an implicit contract.105 These 
staged capital infusions keep the company “on a ‘tight leash’ 
and [reduce] potential losses from bad decisions.”106 
The governance structure created by a venture capital 
fund’s investment contrasts to the Berle-Means governance 
structure where investors have greater equity and far less 
control.107 The venture capital investors have much greater 
control than equity.108 
Noted legal scholars contend that “a well-developed stock 
market that permits venture capitalists to exit through an 
IPO is critical to the existence of a vibrant venture capital 
market.”109 Put differently, IPOs create an exit and 
reinvestment cycle for both the venture capitalists and the 
limited partners who provide capital for the funds of venture 
capital firms. Not only is the cash contribution recycled since 
 
whether or not they contributed any initial funds. This method of 
compensation seeks to motivate the general partner (fund manager) to 
work toward improving the fund’s performance.” Carried Interest, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/carriedinterest.asp 
[perma.cc/4KLK-6XWL]. 
103 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at 
1073. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 84, at 171. 
107 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at 
1073. 
108 Id. at 1073–74 (citing an example of the venture capital investors 
having a majority of the board seats despite not having a majority of the 
equity of the portfolio company). 
109 Black & Gilson, supra note 89, at 245. 
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the limited partners may be repeat investors in other 
venture capital funds of the general partner, but the noncash 
contributions of the venture capital funds will also be 
recycled. The exit addresses three challenges between 
venture capitalists and the limited partners who invest in 
their funds because it allows the limited partners to: (1) 
evaluate the performance of the venture capital firms; (2) 
determine how much to allocate to venture capital relative to 
other investments; and (3) withdraw their funds from 
venture capital firms which are not successful.110 The model 
proposed by Professors Black and Gilson “predicts that the 
[VC’s] successful exits will take place disproportionately 
through IPO. If so, IPO exits will be more profitable than 
exits through sale of the portfolio company. . . .”111 
Professor Gilson identified three basic characteristics of 
the venture capital market based on the organizational and 
contractual techniques that he discusses throughout his 
various articles on the subject: (1) “high power incentives . . . 
for investors, GPs, and entrepreneurs are coupled with very 
intense monitoring,”112 (2) “the organizational and 
contractual structure reflects the use of both explicit and 
implicit contracts,”113 and (3) the braiding of the venture 
capital fund limited partnership agreement and the portfolio 
company investment contract “facilitates the resolution of 
 
110 Id. at 255. In a later article, Gilson and a coauthor note:  
A firm’s decision to go (or remain) public . . . may 
increasingly be less a function of the need to raise risk 
capital or diversity risk, as in the traditional construct, and 
more a balance between the incremental costs of going 
public . . . and the incremental benefits of being a public 
company.  
Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public 
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 231, 258 (2008). 
111 Black & Gilson, supra note 89, at 264. 
112 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at 
1078 (emphasis in original). 
113 Id. 
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problems internal to each.”114 In other words, formal and 
informal contracts are governance mechanisms that work (or 
braid) together in response to the holdup problem.115 
C. CVC 
As discussed in Part I, the purpose of CVC, the levels and 
stage of investment from CVC, and the role of CVC in the 
startup ecosystem have metamorphized over the years.116 
Corporations have different rationales for forming CVC 
arms, including financial returns and gaining perspective on 
what could be the next market disrupter.117 They are also 
motivated by the opportunity to “identify[] novel technologies 
to enhance revenue streams and amplify a corporation’s 
competitive position [and] validation of new market 
segments, as well as [to] leverage[e] relationships between 
the corporate venture capital portfolio and corporate 
business units.”118 Engaging in CVC activities may give 
parent companies access to more disruptive R&D, give R&D 
more scale, and provide companies access to talent and 
 
114 Id. But cf. Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation 
Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV. 281, 309–10 (2016) (arguing that “the 
ownership, prosecution, and protection of foreground [intellectual 
property] are key—if overlooked—topics in many of the agreements that 
form the basis of Gilson et al.’s braiding theory”). 
115 The holdup problem is defined through the lens of contract 
economics which “has focused on how uncertainty and measurement 
problems combine with opportunism and asset specificity to lead to holdup 
problems.” Jennejohn, supra note 114, at 315. 
116 Benchmarking Corporate Venture Capital, CB INSIGHTS,  
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-benchmarking-corporate-venture-
capital [perma.cc/57ES-XTLR]. 
117 See MAHENDRA RAMSINGHANI, THE BUSINESS OF VENTURE CAPITAL 
22 (2d ed. 2014) (opining that everyone is interested in the “newest new 
thing”).  
118 Id. at 22–23. Ramsinghani also notes that “[a]bout 60 percent of 
corporations invest in ventures funds as LPs, and 90 percent of CVCs 
invest directly in [startups].” Id. at 23. 
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markets to which they would not otherwise be exposed.119 
Traditional R&D within the parent company, in contrast, is 
increasingly seen as costly and ineffective.120 
Professor Henry Chesbrough of Harvard Business School 
wrote the seminal piece on corporate venture capital in 
which he identified four different investment categories for 
corporate venture capital: (1) driving, (2) enabling, (3) 
emergent, and (4) passive.121  
A driving investment is both strategic and tightly linked 
to the operations of the company that is investing.122 Such 
an investment sustains the current strategy of the company, 
but does not address when a company is faced with 
disruptive strategies or new opportunities.123 For example, 
Campbell Soup Company’s corporate venture capital arm 
 
119 Not the Same: Understanding Corporate Venture Capital Versus 
Institutional VCs, CB INSIGHTS (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/corporate-venture-capital-
institutional-venture-capital/ [perma.cc/RM25-ZTQ5]. CVCs also look at 
what type of startup will benefit the corporation. As one CVC head noted, 
as a startup, “[y]ou must convey how you can benefit the organization, not 
how it can help you solve the challenges you’re facing as a startup. This 
requires understanding the core business of the fund . . . as well as why 
pursuing a relationship would be mutually beneficial for both 
organizations.” Ilya Pozin, Three Things to Know About Corporate Venture 
Capital, INC. (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.inc.com/ilya-pozin/3-things-to-
know-corporate-venture-capital.html [perma.cc/N7H8-QKGS]. 
120 Josh Lerner, How Corporate Venture Capital Helps Firms Explore 
New Territories, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 10, 2013), 
https://hbr.org/2013/09/how-corporate-venture-capital.html 
[https://perma.cc/6STQ-49ZC] [hereinafter New Territories]. “Corporate 
R&D too often focuses on refining technologies that are already in use . . . . 
For decades in the U.S., billions were spent on big science, and the 
commercial returns were disappointing . . . . R&D has a tendency to be 
slow, rigid, and expensive.” Id. 
121 Chesbrough, supra note 24, at 95. 
122 Id. 
123 “The tight coupling of these investments with a company’s current 
processes means that these investments will sustain the current strategy. 
They will be unlikely to help a corporation cope with disruptive strategies 
or to identify new opportunities when the company must . . . respond to . . . 
a change in the environment.” Id. at 94. 
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could fit into this category because of its investments in 
startups that offer healthier food alternatives.124  
An enabling investment is one which is not as tightly 
interwoven with the company’s own operations, but the goal 
of the investment is primarily strategic.125 This type of 
investment will encourage the development of the company’s 
current ecosystem of suppliers, customers, and third-party 
developers which will in turn enhance the demand for the 
company’s own products.126 Intel Capital is cited as an 
example.127 
The focus of emergent investments is not on enhancing 
strategy, but rather for the startup to be tightly linked to the 
company’s operating capabilities.128 This investment 
strategy can be helpful if the company’s strategy or the 
business environment changes; it provides the company with 
strategic business options beyond any potential financial 
gains the investment may produce.129 In other words, it 
means that the company is investing in a technology that it 
has no current intention to use in its own products, but that 
it was involved in developing and can incorporate into its 
business plans if circumstances change.130 Alphabet is a good 
example: it invests in businesses outside its main products. 
Lastly, a passive investment is neither connected to the 
corporation’s strategy nor is it tightly linked to the 
corporation’s operational capabilities.131 Therefore, the 
 
124 See discussion infra Section III.C and accompanying notes about 
Campbell Soup Company. 
125 Chesbrough, supra note 24, at 95. 
126 “A company can take advantage of this notion by using its [venture 
capital] investments to stimulate the development of the ecosystem in 
which it operates—that is, the suppliers, customers, and third-party 
developers that make goods and services that stimulate demand for the 
company’s own offerings.” Id. 
127 See id. 
128 Id. at 96. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 96–97. 
131 Id. at 97–98. 
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company cannot advance its own business.132 Chesbrough 
even characterizes passive investing as “arguably a misuse of 
shareholders’ funds.”133 The other three investment types, in 
contrast, each cultivate the expansion of a company’s current 
or future businesses.134  
As Professor Chesbrough notes, however, a company’s 
“resources and processes can become liabilities rather than 
capabilities, particularly when it faces new markets or 
disruptive technologies.”135 The investments “are made 
primarily to increase the sales and profits of the 
corporation’s own businesses. A company making a strategic 
investment seeks to identify and exploit synergies between 
itself and a new venture.”136 If the objective is financial, the 
company’s primary goal is a high rate of return.137 
Unlike venture capital funds, the corporations engaged in 
CVC do not need to raise money from limited partners. In 
fact, they may have much more capital at their disposal than 
their venture capital fund counterparts. Sources of capital 
for CVC include the corporate level of the parent company, 
one of the parent company’s business units, or external 
investment partners, such as a venture capital fund; the 
former is the most common.138 In terms of the legal 
mechanics, CVCs are structured in a few different ways: (1) 
corporations join existing venture capital funds as limited 
 
132 “[T]he corporation lacks the means to actively advance its own 
business through these investments.” Id. at 98. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. (including the “Paths to Growth” chart). 
135 Id. at 94. 
136 Id. at 92. 
137 “Here, a corporation seeks to do as well as or better than private 
VC investors, due to what it sees as its superior knowledge of markets and 
technologies, its strong balance sheet, and its ability to be a patient 
investor.” Id. The company’s brand may also attest to the startup’s quality 
to other investors and potential customers. Id. 
138 IAN MACMILLAN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST 
GCR 08-916, CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL (CVC): SEEKING INNOVATION 
AND STRATEGIC GROWTH (2008). 
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partners;139 (2) current operating business units are tasked 
with venture capital investing;140 (3) wholly-owned 
subsidiaries are organized for the exclusive purpose of 
CVC;141 (4) dedicated funds are co-managed by a venture 
capital fund and the corporation;142 and (5) evergreen or 
discretionary funds make investments opportunistically and 
capital is allocated when such opportunities arise.143 CVC 
operations are structured in a variety of ways ranging from 
simple (resembling the general partner, limited partner 
structure of a venture capital fund) to complex.144 “The 
simplest way to structure a [CVC] operation is for the 
corporation to invest as a [venture capitalist] directly from 
the corporate treasury, with employees managing the 
investment activities.”145 Due to financial issues (i.e., 
accounting, tax, and compensation) and internal corporate 
politics, however, corporations have had to implement 
creative structures or contractual arrangements.146 
 
139 Gary Dushnitsky, Corporate Venture Capital: Past Evidence and 
Future Directions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 408 
(Anuradha Basu et al. eds., 2008).  
140 Id.; see discussion infra Subsection III.C and accompanying notes 
(discussing General Mills’ structure). 
141 Nokia Ventures is an example of this. Dushnitsky, supra note 139, 
at 408; see discussion infra Sections III.A and III.B and accompanying 
notes (discussing the structures of GV and Intel Capital). 
142 Sequoia Seed Capital, a joint venture between Sequoia Capital and 
Cisco Systems is an example of a dedicated fund. Dushnitsky, supra note 
139, at 408. 
143 IAN MACMILLAN ET AL., supra note 138. 
144 Asher Bearman, Corporate Venture Capital—An Introduction, 
DLA PIPER: THE VENTURE ALLEY (Feb. 23, 2012), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20151019014806/http://www.theventurealley.c
om/corporate-venture-capital-an-introduction/. 
145 Id. This type of structure may be best suited for new players to 
CVC that are able to be the sole capital source for the venture capital 
investments. Id. 
146 See id. 
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D. The Effect of CVC on Private Ordering 
Thus far, this Article has explained what private ordering 
historically looked like when the two main parties were the 
entrepreneurs and the venture capital fund, and has also 
provided background information on CVCs. Next, this Article 
turns to how the “new” player—CVC—has impacted private 
ordering in the venture capital financing context specifically 
regarding the five techniques that address the three major 
contractual problems. In short, staged financing, control, 
compensation, exit, and reliance on implicit contracts help 
with the problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, 
and opportunism in the form of agency costs. 
First, unlike the goals of a venture capital firm which are 
solely financial, the goals of a CVC are hybrid in nature—
they are both financial and strategic.147 Whether CVC 
investments skew more towards financial or strategic 
depends on which one of Chesbrough’s four categories 
corporate venture capital falls in. In terms of private 
ordering, the two-pronged goals of a CVC may affect the 
staging aspect of a venture capital financing. Staging is 
intended to respond to the high degree of uncertainty that 
early stage companies face.148 In effect, staging gives 
investors the option to cease providing funds if the 
entrepreneur fails to reach certain milestones.149 By creating 
this performance incentive, it “aligns the interests of the 
venture capital fund and entrepreneur.”150 It also reduces 
agency costs because it shifts the decision to continue the 
 
147 VOLANS & GLOBAL CORP. VENTURING, supra note 6, at 9 (Strategy 
includes “[d]eveloping capabilities, access and . . . markets of the parent 
company, aligning with long-term strategy. Multiple CVC units may be 
created to focus on different aspects of the strategy—and they often adapt 
and evolve over time. A strategic CVC investment will identify and 
amplify synergies between itself and the venture.”). 
148 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at 
1078. 
149 Id. at 1079. 
150 Id. 
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startup from the entrepreneur to the venture capital fund.151 
However, a CVC may not be incentivized solely by the goal of 
maximizing its financial return from the investment in the 
startup. As such, a CVC may decide to continue funding a 
startup even if a startup did not reach a particular 
milestone. Alternatively, a CVC may decide not to provide 
additional funding, even if the startup is making progress in 
the business, if the success of the startup is no longer aligned 
with the success of the CVC’s parent. This may increase the 
agency costs since now there are multiple decision-makers 
instead of the venture capital fund and they are not all 
motivated to accomplish the same goals. Also, a CVC may 
still intend to continue to invest in a startup (even if a 
venture capital fund did not) because it may be interested in 
acquiring the company for strategic reasons or seeing how 
the startup develops technology in ways that they may not 
have anticipated. CVCs are not focused on maximizing 
financial returns on their investments like venture capital 
firms are which may frustrate the venture capital firm. The 
firm may disagree with the CVC, yet still be compelled to 
allocate its limited dollars in the venture capital fund to 
continue to maintain the fund’s percentage ownership and 
therefore the control levers set forth in the venture capital 
financing documents. If the CVC was the lead investor in the 
deal, it may also decide to fund the bulk of the round (and 
therefore have the majority or two-thirds vote necessary to 
revise certain key parts of the Certificate of Incorporation, 
such as the antidilution and protective provisions).152 
Recent studies show that CVCs have now expanded their 
investments to all stages of a startup (but still make the 
majority of their investments in the seed/early stage or the 
 
151 Id. at 1080. 
152 See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New 
Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 594–95 (2016). However, if the 
venture capital fund was the lead investor in a prior round of funding, its 
vote would be required to amend the Certificate of Incorporation and 
approve a new round of financing. 
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late stage).153 If a CVC is the lead investor in the early 
stages of a startup or holds a sizeable percentage ownership 
in a particular financing round, the startup will typically 
need its vote for future funding decisions based upon the 
votes required under the amendment provisions in the 
Certificate of Incorporation. As a result, venture capital 
funds will need to navigate how syndicates are formed. 
There is also the question of whether the CVC may be 
around long term to fund the various stages of financing 
(assuming that it would choose to fund at each stage). The 
life span of a venture capital fund is dictated by the terms of 
the limited partnership agreement it enters into and is 
typically between seven to ten years. The life span of a CVC, 
in contrast, may vary widely since it is typically not bound to 
a limited partnership agreement. Generally speaking, CVCs 
now have longer life spans than before, though typically not 
as long as a venture capital fund.154 In the past, CVC 
programs lasted no longer than one to two years.155 In the 
fourth wave, however, the majority of CVC programs have 
been active for four years or longer.156 “The lengthening life 
 
153 PITCHBOOK, 2Q 2017 PITCHBOOK-NVCA VENTURE MONITOR 14 
(2017), http://files.pitchbook.com/pdf/2Q_2017_PitchBook_NVCA_Venture_ 
Monitor.pdf [perma.cc/4GL8-23E8]; 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra note 
17. 
154 There are two groups of CVCs—one with a long history of 
corporate venturing (technology, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, and 
media and publishing) called “CVC first movers” and the other, “CVC 
follower” group comprising of machinery, power and gas production, 
consumer, and construction. Bielesch et al., supra note 19.  
155 Corporate Venture Capital (CVC), EWING MARION KAUFFMAN 
FOUND., http://www.kauffman.org/microsites/state-of-the-field/topics/ 
finance/equity/corporate-venture-capital [perma.cc/WL2Y-MFFK]. 
156 Id. But cf. Gary Dushnitsky, Riding the Next Wave of Corporate 
Venture Capital, 3 BUS. STRATEGY REV. 44, 44 (2011) (which states that the 
average lifespan for CVC in the past was 2.5 years and is now 3.8 years 
with more prominent CVCs now in their second decade of activity). 
Furthermore, forty percent of the approximately 350 corporate investors in 
the 2000–2009 timeframe were in operation for four or more years, which 
was almost double the longevity of CVCs in previous wave. Id. Another 
source reports that CVCs have an average age of five years and 120 last 
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spans of CVC units may be the most compelling evidence 
that venture investing is finding a permanent place in the 
corporate-development arsenal and has become a must-have 
innovation tool in many industries.”157 The increasing 
duration of CVCs indicates the level of commitment of 
corporations to CVCs and shows how commonplace such 
investing is becoming.158 However, it is unclear how long 
more recent corporate investors will remain committed to 
their CVC programs, and is one aspect to keep in mind in the 
context of staged financings.  
Second, Professor Gilson observes that venture capital 
funds typically have more control than equity.159 This control 
is established through the five major documents of a venture 
capital financing: the Certificate of Incorporation, the Stock 
Purchase Agreement, the Investors’ Rights Agreement, the 
Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement, and the 
Voting Agreement. The control levers set forth in the 
documents address the uncertainty and information 
asymmetry of funding early stage companies by incentivizing 
the venture capital fund to closely monitor the startup’s 
 
ten years or more—this is longer than the tenure of many chief executive 
officers. If You Can’t Beat Them, Buy Them, ECONOMIST (Nov. 22, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21633883-fear-
being-displaced-startups-turning-firms-venture-capitalists-if 
[perma.cc/DRT6-LZYM]. 
157 “Average lifetimes of corporate venture units are increasing across 
the board, in industries with a long history of venture activity as well as 
industries that are relative newcomers to the game.” Bielesch et al., supra 
note 19. Since 2002, the life span of CVC units in the pharmaceutical 
industry has increased by fifty percent and, in the case of CVCs in 
technology, from 2002 to 2012, it has increased to almost six years. Id. 
Newcomers to the CVC world also have longer life spans. Id. As an 
example, CVCs in the consumer industry had a lifespan of 10.5 years in 
2012 compared to 3.3 years in 2002. Id. 
158 “No longer an exotic sideline indulged in by a handful of well-
heeled giants in clearly circumscribed industries, it is . . . well on its way 
to becoming a mainstream innovation and corporate-development activity, 
alongside R&D, M&A, and joint venturing.” Id. 
159 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at 
1081–82. 
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progress during each period of the staged financing.160 
However, the role of CVCs in monitoring activities of a 
startup is unclear. As an example, venture capital funds 
typically do not invest in competing companies in their 
specialized area of investment—a venture capital fund would 
not invest in two artificial intelligence companies working to 
solve the exact same problem. In contrast, CVCs may be 
investing in companies that directly compete with each other 
or that have a direct correlation to the work of the parent 
company of the CVC. Furthermore, CVCs are increasingly 
taking board seats. This may impact the levers of control 
currently put in place by the venture capital financing 
documents and also lead to conflicts of interest.  
Third, the compensation structure of both the 
entrepreneur and the investors investing on behalf of the 
venture capital fund, “creates extremely high-powered 
performance incentives that serve to align the incentives of 
the portfolio company management and the venture capital 
fund.”161 The entrepreneurs, who are typically the founders 
and play a management role in the company, receive 
relatively low salaries, but have significant stock ownership 
which has the potential to increase substantially in value if 
the company has a successful exit.162 However, under the 
terms of a Restricted Stock Purchase Agreement, the stock 
vests over time to incentivize the founder to stay during the 
formative years of the company.163  
In the case of the venture capital fund, under the terms of 
the limited partnership agreement between the venture 
capital fund and limited partners, “[b]y investing through a 
financial intermediary, [limited partners] secure the benefit 
of the [general partner’s] skill and experience, which help to 
 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 1083. 
162 Id. 
163 While a founder may be able to negotiate some amount of vesting 
upfront for time put into the company, the vesting schedule needs to be 
reasonable from the perspective of investors to incentivize the founder to 
stay with the company for a longer period of time. See Fan, supra note 152. 
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reduce the level of uncertainty and information asymmetry 
that must be addressed in the contract governing a portfolio 
company’s investment.”164 This benefit comes at a steep 
cost—general partners wield the utmost discretion to use 
their skills and experience to make investments on the 
investors’ behalf.165 The compensation structure addresses 
agency costs by paying carried interest to the general 
partners.166  
CVCs, unlike venture capital funds, may not receive 
carried interest or fixed fees. Therefore, the incentives 
between the venture capital fund and entrepreneur on the 
one hand, and the CVC on the other hand, may be 
misaligned. Some corporations may structure their CVC 
funds as independent or semi-independent funds to ensure 
that corporations can recruit and retain talent to manage 
their respective CVC investments by offering compensation 
that’s competitive with venture capital funds, including 
carried interest.167 While there is growing evidence that 
CVCs are heading in this direction, compensation for CVCs 
is still a work-in-progress.168 If CVCs have compensation 
structures similar to venture capital funds, it is easier to 
retain the employees who are investing in portfolio 
companies. If the personal compensation of each of the major 
players is tied to the success of the startup, there will be an 
alignment of interests of all parties involved.169 
 
164  Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at 
1088. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 1088–89. Carried interest is typically 20% of the of the 
venture capital fund’s profits. There is also a yearly fixed fee of 2% to 
2.5%. See id. at 1090. 
167 Id. 
168 See Dana Olsen, These 5 Charts Illustrate Current CVC 
Compensation Trends, PITCHBOOK (Apr. 5, 2017), 
https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/these-5-charts-illustrate-current-cvc-
compensation-trends [perma.cc/8V75-58LT].  
169 That being said, the “intensity of the performance incentives 
created by the compensation structure gives rise to a corresponding 
incentive for the venture capital to monitor the portfolio company’s 
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In order to ensure that funds are deployed effectively, 
corporate venture capitalists cannot “become entangled in 
the agendas of various corporate stakeholders or 
demotivated by inadequate or poorly designed financial 
incentives. That’s why it’s important that venture funds’ 
goals be aligned with corporate objectives, approvals for 
funding be streamlined, and compensation levels match 
those offered by independent venture groups.”170 One study 
showed that there was a direct correlation between the 
performance of CVCs and payment structure—if the 
investment professionals employed by CVCs had similar 
performance pay to venture capital funds then their 
performance was better.171 
Fourth, while venture capital funds are highly motivated 
to exit and strive to provide significant returns to their 
limited partners, CVCs do not operate within the same time 
limitations nor are they necessarily motivated by financial 
concerns. In fact, taking CVC money may have the 
unintended effect of allowing private companies to stay 
private longer because CVCs are not pushed to exit by 
limited partners like venture capital and private equity 
funds are.172 The dramatic increase in corporate venture 
capital activity contributed to mind-boggling valuations of 
private companies. When corporate venture capital was 
deployed in later stage financings (at a rate of nearly thirty-
 
performance. This monitoring, together with the signaling properties of 
the entrepreneur’s willingness to accept such powerful incentives, also 
serves to reduce information asymmetries.” Gilson, Engineering a Venture 
Capital Market, supra note 84, at 1084. 
170 New Territories, supra note 120. 
171 See Gary Dushnitsky & Zur Shapira, Entrepreneurial Finance 
Meets Organizational Reality: Comparing Investment Practices and 
Performance of Corporate and Independent Venture Capitalists, 31 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 990 (2010). 
172 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY 
MARKETS ARE STAGNATING (2017), http://www.capmktsreg.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/US-Public-Equity-Markets-are-Stagnating.pdf 
[perma.cc/4BKB-DCFG]. 
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six percent)173 with “tourist” investors, such as hedge funds 
and mutual funds, joining the venture capital financing 
bandwagon, company valuations spun out of control.174 This, 
in turn, created the explosion of the unicorn phenomenon.175 
Now, private companies with arguably more weight and 
influence than some public companies choose to stay private 
longer.176 There is a dearth of public company offerings and 
many companies are unwilling to contemplate a possible 
down round177 because they view it as a failure.178 
Acquisitions are also not likely options for highly valued 
private companies since few companies can afford them. 
 
173 See NVCA, Corporate Venture Engagement Rise, supra note 58. 
174 See Unusual Suspects: Hedge Funds, Mutual Funds, and Banks 
Put the Brakes on Tech Startup Deals, CB INSIGHTS (Mar. 15, 2016), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/tech-crossover-investors-slowdown/ 
[perma.cc/R56Z-YLEC] (noting the effect of crossover or tourist investors, 
such as hedge funds and mutual funds during the unicorn boom: in 2015 
alone, crossover investors invested more than $40 billion in almost 800 
deals related to private technology companies).  
175 See Fan, supra note 152 (discussing how the outsized effect of 
unicorns on the marketplace necessitates changes in the current 
disclosure regime under federal securities laws); Brad Feld, Current 
Startup Market Emotional Biases, FELD THOUGHTS (Apr. 21, 2016), 
http://www.feld.com/archives/2016/04/current-startup-market-emotional-
biases.html [perma.cc/HDW5-ES22] (reflecting on Bill Gurley’s post and 
discussing emotional biases which prevent the unicorns from taking part 
in down rounds; Feld urges looking to long-term value rather than paper 
value); see also Fred Wilson, Don’t Kick the Can Down the Road, AVC 
(Apr. 21, 2016), http://avc.com/2016/04/dont-kick-the-can-down-the-road/ 
[perma.cc/2ZHG-JYJP] (calling for hard decisions to be made now rather 
than later regarding unicorns and other startups). For the definition of a 
down round, see infra note 177. 
176 See Fan, supra note 152, at 637. 
177 “A down round occurs in private financing when investors 
purchase stock or convertible bonds from a company at a lower valuation 
than the preceding round.” Down Round, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/downround.asp [perma.cc/ 5M6A-
E6C6]. 
178 See Bill Gurley, On the Road to Recap: Why the Unicorn Financing 
Market Just Became Dangerous . . . for All Involved, ABOVE THE CROWD 
(Apr. 21, 2016), http://abovethecrowd.com/2016/04/21/on-the-road-to-recap/ 
[perma.cc/GP5Y-BDCW].  
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Investors in unicorns then turn to the secondary markets for 
liquidity; rank and file employees (unlike investors) may not 
be able to sell their shares on the secondary markets as they 
may be contractually bound from doing so.179 
In the first quarter of 2016, there were no IPOs of venture 
capital-backed technology companies;180 the technology IPO 
market at that time was reminiscent of the numbers during 
the Great Recession.181 Although IPO activity was up in the 
second quarter of 2016 with sixteen IPOs (with eight VC-
backed technology companies in this group), the first half of 
2016 still lagged significantly behind the first half of 2015 
with a forty-one percent drop.182 Twilio, a communications 
application startup, completed the largest IPO of the 
 
179 Unicorns do this all under the cloak of secrecy since very little 
disclosure is required of them. See Fan, supra note 152 (discussing the 
adverse consequences of the lack of disclosure required of unicorns). 
180 William D. Cohan, Good Luck Getting Out!, FORTUNE (Feb. 1, 
2016), http://fortune.com/silicon-valley-tech-ipo-market/ [perma.cc/DH2H-
PYVQ] (discussing problems with the current way initial public offerings 
are conducted). There were, on average, thirty-six VC-backed IPOs per 
year from 2012–2014; that number decreased to twenty-three in 2015 with 
only seven IPOs occurring in the latter half of the year. Id. Also, the 
profitability of technology companies has plummeted—in 2015, the median 
EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) for 
tech companies was –$9 million. Id. 
181 See Alison Griswold, The Market for Tech IPOs Hasn’t Been This 
Awful Since the Great Recession, QUARTZ (Apr. 1, 2016), 
http://qz.com/652261/the-market-for-tech-ipos-hasnt-been-this-awful-since-
the-great-recession/ [perma.cc/YW6H-FH76]; Rolfe Winkler, For Silicon 
Valley, the Hangover Begins, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2016, 8:12 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/for-silicon-valley-the-hangover-begins-
1455930769 [perma.cc/KMT4-VSM4] (discussing how once-high-flying 
startups are now retrenching); Kevin Dowd, Lackluster Opening for 
SecureWorks in First U.S. Tech IPO of 2016, PITCHBOOK (Apr. 25, 2016),  
http://pitchbook.com/news/articles/lackluster-opening-for-secureworks-in-
first-us-tech-ipo-of-2016 [perma.cc/CMY7-ASK9] (discussing how 
SecureWorks’s lackluster opening may dissuade other tech companies 
from going public). 
182 CB INSIGHTS, THE H1 2016 GLOBAL TECH EXITS REPORT 5 (2016). 
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quarter.183 By the end of 2016, a total of forty-one venture-
backed companies had gone public.184 Things started to look 
up in 2017 with fifty-eight venture-backed companies going 
public, but the expected increase in IPOs after a promising 
beginning fizzled.185  
On the merger and acquisition front, in the first three 
quarters of 2016, “[d]eal flow . . . slowed considerably” and 
there were fewer quality companies.186 “There have been an 
average of [three] $1 [billion plus] exits in tech over the last 
six quarters. At this rate, it would take . . . [a] two-term 
presidency, plus another five years, for all the . . . tech 
unicorns to exit.”187 
However, if a startup is backed by a CVC, there may be 
positive outcomes regarding the following: (1) 
decisionmaking process of the startup to go public; (2) type of 
backing it receives during the IPO process; and (3) 
performance of the stock after going public. One study noted 
that when startups receive money from corporations they 
“are more likely to list their shares than are those 
championed by conventional venture groups.”188 In another 
study, researchers found that startups with money from 
corporations are more likely to attract the attention of 
 
183 Twilio raised $150 million on the first day of its IPO. Corrie 
Driebusch, Twilio Raises More than Expected in IPO, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 
2016, 7:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/twilio-ipo-tests-markets-
appetite-for-tech-companies-1466606076 [perma.cc/45ER-D22R]. 
184 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N & PITCHBOOK, 4Q 2017 VENTURE 
MONITOR 3 (2017), https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/ 
4Q_2017_PitchBook_NVCA_Venture_Monitor.pdf [perma.cc/5DNY-PLQS]. 
185 Id. 
186 PITCHBOOK, M&A REPORT 3Q 2016 (2016), https:// 
pitchbook.com/news/reports/3q-2016-ma-report [perma.cc/EG3Q-FX63] 
(noting that the deals that do go through command “outsized multiples”). 
187 E-mail Newsletter from Marcelo Ballve, Research Director, CB 
Insights, to CB Insights subscribers (Sept. 23, 2016, 4:18 PM) (on file with 
author). 
188 If You Can’t Beat Them, Buy Them, supra note 156. In addition, 
“[a] bank in Silicon Valley estimated . . . that corporate [venture capital] 
yields three times the number of patents per dollar invested than in-house 
R&D.” Id. 
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investment banks, equity analysts, and institutional 
investors when they go public when compared to those 
backed by venture capital funds.189 The researchers further 
showed that in the first three years as public companies, 
those that were backed by corporate venture capital funds 
did better, on average, on stock price performance than such 
venture capital funds.190  
Fifth, although not required by the venture capital 
financing documents, the venture capital fund “is expected to 
make important noncash contributions to the portfolio 
company.”191 It helps a startup recruit the management 
team, intensively monitors the performance of the startup, 
and uses its reputation capital to give credibility to the 
startup with respect to potential customers, suppliers, and 
employees.192 CVCs, on the other hand, offer other non-
financial contributions, including access to the resources and 
opportunities afforded to parent companies of CVCs, possible 
collaboration with market development and sales, access to 
follow-on funding, and the infrastructure of the corporate 
parent.193 In particular, Dave McClure, who was previously 
at 500 Startups, stated that the “primary advantage that 
corporate VC has over traditional VC is customers and 
distribution.”194 However, the problem is that those who run 
venture capital funds remain leery of CVCs. 
 
189 See generally Thomas J. Chemmanur et al., Corporate Venture 
Capital, Value Creation, and Innovation, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2434 (2014). 
190 See id. 
191 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at 
1072. 
192 Id. 
193 Robert C. White, Jr., Corporate Venture Capital Investments—
Good for Startups?, SEC. EDGE (Feb. 2, 2016), 
http://www.thesecuritiesedge.com/2016/02/corporate-venture-capital-
investments-good-for-startups/ [perma.cc/UBZ4-DX76]. 
194 Startups Are the New Corporate R&D, CB INSIGHTS (Jan. 13, 
2017), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/corporate-vc-startup-innovation/ 
[perma.cc/M7M3-J7YS]. 
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With notable exceptions, such as Intel Capital195 and 
GV,196 leaders of venture capital funds generally do not hold 
corporate venture capitalists in high esteem, derisively 
characterizing them as “innovation theater”197 or “dumb 
money”198 because they view CVCs as adding little value and 
not being as valuation-sensitive. In fact, some venture 
capitalists argue that CVC investments can be harmful to 
startups.199 When Alphabet (formerly Google) initially 
considered forming a corporate venture capital arm, it was 
not well received.200 Union Square Ventures’ Fred Wilson 
 
195 See INTEL CAPITAL, http://www.intelcapital.com/ [perma.cc/UJC8-
NH66]. 
196 When Google first contemplated a corporate venture capital arm, 
noted venture capitalist Fred Wilson, a partner at Union Square Ventures, 
one of the most prominent venture capital firms, said:  
We like working with corporate investors in the right 
situations and we’d certainly love to work with Google 
considering all that they bring to the table. But I do think 
that venture investing is not the best use of a corporation’s 
capital and that it is inevitable that it will produce sub-par 
returns at best and significant losses at worst. And as a 
Google shareholder, I’d prefer to see them do something 
else with all that money they are making.  
Fred Wilson, Corporate Venture Capital, AVC (July 31, 2008), 
http://avc.com/2008/07/corporate-ventu/ [perma.cc/22YB-6JAB]. Mr. 
Wilson also states that corporate venture capital can’t keep the talent that 
it needs; a successful investment is just a one-time gain for the parent 
company; and there is a misalignment of the motives of the corporate 
venture capital arm on the one hand and the founders, management, and 
financial investors on the other. See id. 
197 CB Insights Presents: Corporate Innovation Theater in 8 Acts, CB 
INSIGHTS (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/corporate-
innovation-theatre/ [perma.cc/Q33N-LDAH]. 
198 Mark Lennon, Corporate Venture Investors Starting to Look a Lot 
More Like Private VCs, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 5, 2013), 
http://techcrunch.com/2013/11/05/corporate-venture-investors-starting-to-
look-a-lot-more-like-private-vcs/ [perma.cc/WE5V-7HJ4]. 
199 See discussion supra note 196. 
200 “‘There were some in the venture world who weren’t particularly 
welcoming to Bill [Maris, head of what was then called Google Ventures,] 
or Google Ventures,’ recalls John Doerr, a legendary partner at Kleiner 
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said as recently as 2016 that when startups take money from 
corporations they are “doing business with the devil” and 
that “[c]orporate investing is dumb.”201 Mr. Wilson opined, 
“These type of investments and relationships have almost 
universally ‘sucked’ for our portfolio companies. The 
corporate strategic investor’s objectives are generally at odds 
with the objectives of the entrepreneur, the company, and 
the financial investors. I strongly advise against entering 
into these kinds of relationships.”202 He is not alone in his 
unfavorable sentiment about CVC. Keith Rabois, a partner 
at Khosla Ventures, intimated that GV’s ability to lead 
rounds in high profile companies was easier because 
financial returns did not concern GV.203 He said, it was 
“much easier to lead rounds if you don’t care about earning a 
return.”204 Bill Gurley, a general partner at another VC firm, 
Benchmark Capital, observed, “There is an inherent paradox 
to the notion of corporate venture . . . .”205 As a result, some 
 
Perkins Caufield & Byers, one of the most important first-generation 
California [traditional venture capital] firms.” Katrina Brooker, Google 
Ventures and the Search for Immortality, BLOOMBERG: MKTS. (Mar. 8, 
2015, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-
09/google-ventures-bill-maris-investing-in-idea-of-living-to-500/ 
[perma.cc/W9WG-PWV2]. 
201 The History of CVC, supra note 18. In 2013, Fred Wilson said that 
he would “never ever ever ever do” a deal with corporate venture 
capitalists. The Rise of Corporations in Tech Venture Capital Investment—
Are Tech VCs Going to Have to Play Nice with Corporate Investors?, CB 
INSIGHTS (Sept. 23, 2013), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/tech-corporate-
venture-capital-balance-sheet/ [perma.cc/F2JS-85X5]. 
202 Fred Wilson, On Corporate VCs, AVC (June 20, 2013), 
http://avc.com/2013/06/on-corporate-vcs/ [perma.cc/BC7A-3FEP]. 
203 See Keith Rabois (@Rabois), TWITTER (Sept. 22, 2013, 2:40 PM), 
https://twitter.com/rabois/status/381895737505624064/ [perma.cc/VU7G-
43RC]. 
204 Id. 
205 Brooker, supra note 200. “The conflict is, do the fund’s loyalties lie 
with the startup or with the parent? Just about every independent venture 
capitalist in tech has stories of being burned by corporate funds.” Id. The 
corporation either uses its CVC investment to gather intelligence and 
competes with the startup or no longer has an interest and decides not to 
fund the startup. Id. 
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CVCs, particularly those with no reputation in venture 
investing or who are not as well-established, may find it 
difficult to syndicate (e.g., put together groups of investors), 
which is critical to most venture capital investing.  
The implicit contract between general partners and their 
portfolio companies is that when the startup transfers 
discretion to the general partners, the general partners are 
then policed by a reputation market. In other words, since 
general partners are repeat players in the venture capital 
industry, there is an understanding between them and their 
portfolio companies that they will act appropriately and 
conform to shared expectations based on previous deals in 
the venture capital arena.206 Given that many of the CVCs 
are new players in venture capital financings, they do not 
have much in the way of reputation capital. Therefore, it is 
up to the venture capital funds or entrepreneurs to obtain 
information about the CVC since they cannot rely on 
reputation capital.  
There are three components that are necessary for a 
reputation market to operate. First, the party whose 
discretion will be policed by the market must anticipate 
repeated future transactions. Second, participants must have 
shared expectations of what constitutes appropriate behavior 
by the party to whom discretion has been transferred. 
Finally, those who will deal with the advantaged party in the 
future must be able to observe whether that party’s behavior 
in past dealings conforms to shared expectations.207 
However, as Part III shows, information is limited in all 
these areas for CVCs. As a result, there is a question of how 
startups obtain the potential information that they need 
about a CVC arm since many of them do not have the same 
reputational aspects that venture capital funds do. 
 
206 See Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, 
at 1086. 
207 Id. 
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III. CHALLENGES OF CVC IN PRIVATE ORDERING  
In Part II, this Article discussed how private ordering 
addresses the three major problems of financial contacts: 
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and opportunism in the 
form of agency costs. Specifically, it discussed how CVC 
impacts five techniques—staged financing, control, 
compensation, exit, and reliance on implicit contracts (i.e., 
the role of the reputation market)—which have historically 
worked well in the venture capital fund and entrepreneur 
context. Using five case studies, this Part examines the 
challenges facing CVCs with respect to private ordering in 
the VC context, highlighting both the promise and perils of 
CVC.  
A. GV Case Study 
GV is one of the most prolific CVCs—in the seed stage 
alone, it is the fourth most active seed investor in all of 
venture capital.208 GV has a formidable array of resources to 
entice startups to work with it, including that any startup it 
invests in can have access to anyone at Google.209 It also has 
a design team that has been likened to a SWAT team for 
startups that can troubleshoot any problem a startup may 
have.210 GV’s diverse investments are illustrated by its 
recent exits.211 Under Chesbrough’s framework, GV would be 
engaging in emergent investments. The startups it invests in 
are outside its core business (Google) and instead suggest 
 
208 Since 2010, GV has invested in 135 seed-stage deals making it the 
fourth most active seed investor among all venture capital investors. The 5 
Most Active Seed Investors, PITCHBOOK (May 2, 2016), 
http://pitchbook.com/newsletter/the-5-most-active-seed-investors/ 
[perma.cc/U73P-MX3E]. 
209 See Brooker, supra note 200. 
210 Id. 
211 Google Strategy Teardown: Betting the Future on AI, Cloud 
Services, and (Tamed) Moonshots, CB INSIGHTS (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/google-strategy-teardown/#gv/ 
[perma.cc/E3S3-HLMP]. 
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future directions in which the company is heading.212 
Alphabet Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Alphabet”), is the 
public holding company of Google.213 Alphabet’s Form 10-K 
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016 states, “Google is 
not a conventional company. We do not intend to become one 
. . . . [We] make smaller bets in areas that might seem very 
speculative or even strange when compared to our current 
businesses.”214 These bets that they refer to are reported as 
“Other Bets” and include GV, along with a few other 
businesses that are not part of Google’s core business; these 
various operating segments are characterized as not 
individually material.215 Other Bets is mentioned forty-two 
times in the Form 10-K, primarily in the financial section.216 
Other Bets revenue is listed as $327 million in 2014, $445 
million in 2015, and $809 million in 2016.217 It had operating 
losses of $1.893 billion in 2014, $3.456 billion in 2015, and 
$3.578 billion in 2016.218  
 
212 Alphabet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204417000008/go
og10-kq42016.htm [perma.cc/N8EX-8JNU] [hereinafter Alphabet Form 10-
K]. 
213 According to the company’s Form 10-K, 
Alphabet is a collection of businesses—the largest of which, 
of course, is Google. It also includes businesses that are 
generally pretty far afield of our main Internet products 
such as Access, Calico, CapitalG, GV, Nest, Verily, Waymo, 
and X. We report all non-Google businesses collectively as 
Other Bets. Our Alphabet structure is about helping each 
of our businesses prosper through strong leaders and 
independence. 
Id. 
214 Id. 
215 See id. 
216 A search for “Other Bets” in the Form 10-K yielded thirty-five hits. 
217 Alphabet Form 10-K, supra note 212, at 24. “Revenues from the 
Other Bets are derived primarily through the sales of internet and TV 
services through Google Fiber, sales of Nest products and services, and 
licensing and R&D services through Verily.” Id. at 23. 
218 Id. at 80. 
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More specifically, in the risk factors section of its Form 
10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016. Alphabet 
notes, “[m]aintaining and enhancing the brands of both 
Google and Other Bets increases our ability to enter new 
categories and launch new and innovative products that 
better serve the needs of our users.”219 This statement 
indicates the potential influence that GV’s investment in a 
particular startup could have for the long-term goals of 
Alphabet.220 There was no specific information about GV in 
Alphabet’s Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 
2016. However, there were references to “Non-Marketable 
Investments,” which undoubtedly included GV-related 
investments.221 
As of June 2017, GV had $2.4 billion in assets under 
management of which $167.56 million was “dry powder.”222 
In addition, it had a total of 570 investments and 141 exits, 
and fifty-one professionals working for GV.223 According to a 
PitchBook report, GV’s investment preferences are as 
follows: (1) its preferred investment amount is between $0.25 
million to $50 million; (2) it prefers a minority stake; (3) it 
prefers to originate a deal; (4) it will lead a deal; and (5) it 
 
219 Id. at 13. 
220 GV is mentioned in Alphabet’s filings with the SEC, but it differs 
from most other in-house CVC funds. “The firm makes its investments 
independent of its parent’s corporate strategy. It can back any company it 
wants, whether or not it fits with Google’s plans. The fund also can sell its 
stakes to whomever it wants, including Google competitors. Facebook and 
Yahoo have bought startups funded by [GV].” Brooker, supra note 200. 
221 The line item “Purchases of non-marketable investments” in the 
Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements is of particular interest 
because it indicates the amount of money spent on equity investments and 
debt securities. Alphabet Form 10-K, supra note 212, at 46.  
222 See GV, PITCHBOOK, https://my.pitchbook.com/#page/ 
profile_178611086 [hereinafter GV PitchBook Report]. Dry powder is 
defined as “a slang term referring to marketable securities that are highly 
liquid and considered cash-like.” Dry Powder, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/drypowder.asp [perma.cc/U637-
NBWB]. 
223 See GV PitchBook Report, supra note 222. 
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will syndicate.224 This information, however, was not 
available in any SEC filing, but through PitchBook, a 
comprehensive database that provides information and 
analytics about investments.225 This database is a resource 
that is only available through a paid subscription and is not 
available to (or affordable for) everyone. Although not 
required by law to report such information for the benefit of 
startups, more transparency helps startups that GV invests 
in or is considering investing in to have a better 
understanding of how they fit into GV’s long-term strategy.  
In May 2017, GV invested in a number of startups. The 
investments included $15 million in the Series B round of 
FullStory, a software company; $50 million in the Series B 
round of Magenta Therapeutics, a biotechnology company 
and drug developer; and $10 million in the Series A round of 
Abundant Robotics, an apple-picking robot manufacturer.226  
Like venture capital funds, GV engages in staged 
financing and has disproportionate control compared to its 
equity in any given portfolio company.227 It is unclear 
whether its compensation structure mimics venture capital 
funds.228 GV is not motivated to exit as venture capital funds 
are since it does not have limited partners that it needs to 
provide substantial returns for. That being said, however, it 
 
224 See id. 
225 See generally PITCHBOOK, https://pitchbook.com/ [perma.cc/8S6K-
AMYC]. The report generated by PitchBook’s platform also contains 
information on the parent and sister companies of GV, all investments, 
exits and co-investors, stated investment preferences, service providers, 
and related news. See GV PitchBook Report, supra note 222.  
226 GV PitchBook Report, supra note 222. Alphabet may consider 
incorporating this more specific information into its periodic reports in 
tabular format as it gives more context to the information it currently 
provides on its CVC investments.  
227 See generally Google Strategy Teardown, supra note 211. 
228 There has been cursory mention of “competitive compensation,” 
and “carried interest” but not much in the way of details. See Dan 
Primack, Bill Maris Steps Down as CEO of Google Ventures, FORTUNE 
(Aug. 10, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/10/bill-maris-google-ventures/ 
[perma.cc/DS8R-9Z2X]. 
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has among the highest number of exits among CVCs.229 
Although initially looked upon with disdain by venture 
capital funds, GV is now highly regarded and reputable in 
the eyes of the venture capital community.230 Since it is a 
repeat player in the venture capital arena that venture 
capital funds want to syndicate with,231 there is an implicit 
contract that GV will act how the traditional venture capital 
firms have become accustomed to it acting. Also, GV provides 
nonfinancial help by providing access to its infrastructure 
and talent as noted in the initial description of it above.232 
Although GV acts more like a venture capital fund and 
has established a reputation in venture capital given its 
longevity, it diverges from a venture capital fund in the 
control category of private ordering. As a general matter, 
CVCs need to tread carefully when determining the 
appropriate number of boards that they can serve on and 
what type of decisions they may need to recuse themselves 
from. This can help address concerns that governance 
procedures are being ignored in the startup context. In the 
2009 survey “A Seat at the Table Study” conducted by the 
National Venture Capital Association and venture capital 
research firm Dow Jones VentureSource, the two 
organizations reported that venture capitalists serve on an 
average of 4.4 boards (compared to 4 in 2006), but venture 
capitalists believe that 4.6 board seats for early-stage 
companies and 5.4 for later-stage companies is ideal; chief 
executive officers, in contrast, believe that the ideal number 
 
229 Analyzing the Top Corporate VCs by Exits—and How Early They 
Got In, CB INSIGHTS (Aug. 27, 2015), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/top-corporate-venture-firms-exits/ 
[perma.cc/YSK3-FEDM]. 
230 Compare Richard Waters, Bumbpy Ride for Google Ventures, FIN. 
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/de210fe6-9c3b-11e5-b45d-
4812f209f861 with Michael Rapoport, What’s Behind $3 Billion of 
Alphabet’s Earnings Gains, WALL ST. J. (April 24, 2018 1:11 PM), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2018/04/24/whats-behind-3-billion-of-
alphabets-earnings-gain/. 
231 See Google Strategy Teardown, supra note 211. 
232 Id.  
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of board seats for VCs is 3.8 seats for early-stage companies 
and 4.2 for later-stage companies.233 GV typically gets a seat 
on the board as an investor in a private company. Out of the 
“Top 25 Board Seats” in a PitchBook report on GV, only 
three were board observers; the remaining twenty-two were 
voting board seats.234 One of the general partners of GV, 
Andrew Wheeler, is on seven of the “Top 25 Board Seats” 
representing GV’s interests;235 Mr. Wheeler serves on the 
boards of thirteen companies in the aggregate.236 In light of 
the increasing complexity of private companies (e.g., Uber 
and other unicorns) and startups staying private longer, the 
question is whether service on such a high number of boards 
remains manageable. Former SEC Chair Mary Jo White 
observed, “As the latest batch of [startups] mature, generate 
revenue, achieve significant valuations, but stay private, it is 
important to assess whether they are likewise maturing 
their governance structures and internal control 
environments to match their size and market impact.”237 She 
suggested that startups should look at expanding board 
seats to include those who have had experience with large 
 
233 Scott Austin, New Study Peers into Venture-Backed Company 
Boardroom, WALL ST. J.: VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Nov. 10, 2009, 7:58 
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2009/11/10/new-study-peers-into-
venture-backed-company-boardroom/ [perma.cc/L88X-JE79].  
234 See GV PitchBook Report, supra note 222. 
235 See id. Note that the report only covers the top twenty-five board 
seats—he could be on more since GV has 501 total investments. Richard 
Miner, another General Partner of GV, sits on four of the top twenty-five 
boards and Krishna Yeshwant, yet another General Partner of GV, sits on 
two. See id. 
236 See Andrew Wheeler, PITCHBOOK, https://my-pitchbook-
com/#page/profile_793205757. 
237 Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 
SEC-Rock Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 
31, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-
initiative-3-31-16.html/ [perma.cc/X7XG-D6UP] (discussing private 
companies—with particular references to unicorns—and the role of SEC 
rules and regulatory actions to foster innovation while protecting 
investors). 
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companies and public companies.238 In this manner, having 
board members designated by CVCs may be helpful since 
they provide a public company perspective that board 
members representing a venture capital fund typically 
cannot. Additionally, she stressed the importance of having 
board members with the appropriate regulatory and 
financial expertise, including those with relevant industry 
expertise to ensure differing viewpoints and the ability to 
spot critical issues.239 
Part of what private ordering strives to do is prevent 
opportunistic behavior by either the entrepreneur or venture 
capital fund through the five techniques discussed earlier. 
There may be more of a danger of opportunistic behavior and 
potential conflicts of interest for CVCs, however, since they 
do not have the same motivations as venture capital funds. 
For example, Alphabet has developed autonomous driving 
vehicles and has invested heavily (through GV) in 
competitors in the space, such as Uber.240 Interestingly, 
David Krane, the managing partner and CEO of GV, sat on 
Uber’s board.241 Although Mr. Krane has very close ties to 
Alphabet—he was one of Google’s first 100 employees and 
has been involved with a number of Google’s $1 billion plus 
exits—he remained a member of the Uber board until 
recently.242 The conflicts have only intensified in recent 
 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See E-mail Newsletter from Kerry Wu, Auto Tech Industry 
Analyst, CB Insights, to Auto Tech Insights by CB Insights subscribers 
(Sept. 1, 2016, 8:33 PM) (on file with author); Mikey Tom, Alphabet, Uber 
Set to Go Head-to-Head, PITCHBOOK (Aug. 30, 2016), 
http://pitchbook.com/news/articles/alphabet-and-uber-set-to-go-head-to-
head/ [perma.cc/U78J-7P2J]; Mark Bergen, Google Ventures’ New Chief, 
David Krane, Is the Überconnector, RECODE (Aug. 12, 2016, 2:10 PM), 
http://www.recode.net/2016/8/12/12445218/google-ventures-david-krane-
connector [perma.cc/E349-4S89]; Uber Technologies, PITCHBOOK, 
https://my.pitchbook.com/#page/profile_1141265663 [hereinafter Uber 
PitchBook Report]. 
241 See Uber PitchBook Report, supra note 240. 
242 See Bergen, supra note 240. 
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months. Waymo, which recently spun-out from Alphabet, 
filed a lawsuit against one of GV’s portfolio companies, Uber, 
alleging theft of trade secrets and intellectual property and 
patent infringement of Waymo’s LiDAR technology by Otto, 
which was acquired by Uber on August 18, 2016.243 
B. Intel Capital Case Study 
Intel Capital, a Delaware corporation and wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Intel Corporation (“Intel”),244 is one of the most 
prolific investors in the corporate venture capital world. 
Under Chesbrough’s framework, Intel Capital is making 
enabling investments. It invests in startups that will expand 
the ecosystem of companies that use Intel’s products. Despite 
that fact, Intel’s Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2016 does not mention Intel Capital at all245 
and there is an oblique reference to investments in the risk 
factors section.246 Since it began in 1991, “Intel Capital has 
 
243 Romain Dillet, Uber Acquires Otto to Lead Uber’s Self-Driving Car 
Effort, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 18, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/ 
2016/08/18/uber-acquires-otto-to-lead-ubers-self-driving-car-effort-report-
says/ [perma.cc/QQ68-YTZG]; Daisuke Wakabayshi, Uber and Waymo 
Settle Trade Secret Suit Over Driverless Cars, N.Y. Times (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/uber-waymo-lawsuit-
driverless.html. “LiDAR” stands for “light detection and ranging.” What is 
LIDAR?, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lidar.html/ [perma.cc/9WRF-6AZ8]. 
LiDAR has risen to the forefront as a piece of technology to further the 
development of self-driving cars.  
244 Intel Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex. 21.1 (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000005086317000012/ex21
112312016q4.html/ [perma.cc/3SXV-BTQZ]. 
245 Intel Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000005086317000012/ 
a10kdocument12312016q4.html/ [perma.cc/9MNM-APU9] [hereinafter 
Intel Corp. Form 10-K]. 
246 In the “Risk Factors” section under the subheading, “We are 
subject to risks associated with transactions[,]” Intel states:  
We invest in companies around the world that we believe 
will further our strategic objectives, stimulate growth in 
the digital economy, create new business opportunities for 
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invested about $12.2 billion in 1,500 companies” in fifty-
seven countries across a range of sectors including security, 
wearable technology and digital media, according to the 
company’s website.247 It is also the leading investor (among 
institutional venture capital investors and CVCs) in certain 
areas, such as the cybersecurity space.248 In addition, Intel 
has invested heavily in the drone space and is the top CVC 
investor in the robotics realm.249 Intel’s R&D as a percentage 
of net revenue was 21.4 percent, equating to $12.740 
billion.250 It is unclear whether Intel Capital is included in 
the R&D number. 
Intel Capital has been at the forefront of venture capital 
investments in newer areas, such as the Internet of Things 
(“IoT”); it has invested in seventeen IoT deals since 2010.251 
 
Intel, and generate financial returns. Our investments 
take different forms, including acquisition of companies to 
further advance our strategic objectives . . . . 
Id. at 21. 
247 Our Advantage, INTEL CAPITAL, http://www.intelcapital.com/ 
advantage/index.html [perma.cc/ZVB5-HHDC]. 
248 The Most Active Cybersecurity VC Investors and Their Investments 
in One Infographic, CB INSIGHTS (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/cybersecurity-most-active-investor-
infographic/ [perma.cc/T8YM-4CKA]. 
249 See E-mail Newsletter from Anand Sanwal, CEO & Co-Founder, 
CB Insights, to CB Insights subscribers (Oct. 6, 2016, 4:05 PM) (on file 
with author). 
250 Intel Corp. Form 10-K, supra note 245, at 27. 
251 Internet of Things refers to the “concept of . . . connecting any 
device with an on and off switch to the Internet (and/or to each other).” 
Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of “The Internet of Things”, FORBES: 
LEADERSHIP (May 13, 2014, 12:05 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-
internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/ [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20180203124208/https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/sim
ple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/]. Since 2010, 
844 investors have participated in at least one IoT deal; $1.22 billion was 
invested in 199 deals. Adley Bowen, A Pile of Dead Unicorns Is Not 
Around the Corner, PITCHBOOK (May 9, 2016), 
http://pitchbook.com/news/articles/a-pile-of-dead-unicorns-is-not-around-
the-corner [perma.cc/NH8U-4YF5]. Two other CVCs were in the top five 
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It has been quite active in the drone space as well.252 Intel’s 
corporate venture capital investments are noted in five 
sections in its Form 10-K: Risk Factors; Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Results 
of Operations; Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures 
About Market Risk; Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows; 
and Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. However, 
the Form 10-K does not tie those investments explicitly to 
Intel Capital.253 It states in part, “We regularly invest in 
non-marketable equity instruments of private companies, 
which range from early-stage companies that are often still 
defining their strategic direction to more mature companies 
with established revenue streams and business models.”254 
Intel reported that the carrying value of its non-marketable 
equity investment portfolio amounted to $4.4 billion as of 
December 31, 2016255 and specified that such investments 
were “classified within other long-term assets . . . .”256 A 
number of items fall under long-term assets and only after 
reviewing the Form 10-K several times, did the author 
discover that the information about CVC investments was 
 
for IoT investments: Cisco Investments was tied with Kleiner Perkins 
Caufield & Byers for second place and Qualcomm Ventures was tied for 
fifth place with Kima Ventures. See id. 
252 Intel Capital, Airware’s Commercial Drone Fund (a venture arm 
for Airware, a drone startup), and GV were tied for second most active 
CVCs. See Qualcomm, Intel, and Google Ventures Among the Top 
Corporates Betting on Drones, CB INSIGHTS (May 10, 2016), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/drone-startups-corporate-investment/ 
[perma.cc/RT34-DE7F]. Qualcomm Ventures was also noted as another 
corporate venture arm increasingly active in the drone space; it was 
ranked the top CVC in this space. See id. In 2012, only one CVC 
participated in a drone-related startup; by 2015 the number of deals had 
dramatically increased. See id. Most of the more recent deals were focused 
on seed or Series A stages (partially because there were no later stage 
deals since it is a relatively new area of investment). See id. 
253 Intel Corp. Form 10-K, supra note 245. 
254 Id. at 60.  
255 This number excludes equity derivatives. Id. 
256 Id.  
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buried in the section addressing equity method 
investments.257 
Although Intel provided some information about its 
investments in private companies, it was somewhat opaque 
and obscure. As was the case with GV, the most pertinent 
information came from a non-publicly available source, 
PitchBook. According to PitchBook, Intel Capital has $1.30 
billion in assets under management, a total of 1610 
investments, and 705 exits.258 There are seventy-nine 
professionals who work at Intel Capital, and a management 
team that oversees it.259 In any given month, Intel Capital 
may have a number of investments at different stages of the 
portfolio companies. For example, in May 2017, Intel Capital 
invested almost $84 million in three different ventures, 
including $65.32 million in the later stage Series B round of 
Peloton Technology, an automated vehicle technology 
company specializing in freight transportation.260 
Despite the fact that Intel Capital has been doing CVC 
investments longer than most corporations, it does not 
always subscribe to the private ordering framework. For 
example, it may not stage its financings which may impact 
the portfolio’s company’s particular expectations as well as 
the venture capital funds that may be investing alongside 
Intel Capital. Intel Capital may decide to fund the company 
in one big round like they did in the case of Cloudera, a 
 
257 The equity method “is an accounting technique used by firms to 
assess the profits earned by their investments in other companies.” Equity 
Method, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
e/equitymethod.asp/ [perma.cc/JQP4-UJ6M]. It is commonly used “when 
one company has significant influence over another. When a company 
holds approximately twenty to twenty-five percent or more of another 
company’s stock, it is considered to have significant control, which 
signifies the power one company can exert over another company. This 
power includes representation on the board of directors.” Id. 
258 Intel Capital, PITCHBOOK, https://my-pitchbook-
com/#page/profile_402709779 (last visited April 25, 2018) [hereinafter 
Intel Capital PitchBook Report]. 
259 See id. 
260 See id. 
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software company, which went public in 2017.261 This, in 
turn, skews the valuation of the company. Cloudera 
ultimately ended up going public at a valuation below the 
valuation at which Intel Capital invested.262 It is also 
unclear how intensively Intel Capital monitors its portfolio 
companies or provides its marketing and infrastructure 
might to them. Since Intel Capital falls under Chesbrough’s 
enabling investments category, its main motivation is to 
build up its ecosystem of potential customers, not to 
necessarily help the company with an exit.263 Therefore, like 
with most CVCs, the lack of impetus to exit in some ways 
misaligns their goals with the venture capital funds and 
entrepreneurs. With respect to the compensation question, 
there are no publicly available sources that detail how Intel 
Capital compensates those who invest on their behalf. 
However, given that Intel Capital is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary, those that make the investment decisions most 
likely receive carried interest.264 Lastly, like GV, Intel 
 
261 Katie Roof, Cloudera Posts Long-Awaited IPO Filing, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 31, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/31/cloudera-
posts-long-awaited-ipo-filing/ [perma.cc/47A3-V83M]. 
262  Cloudera had a valuation of $4.1 billion after its Series F round in 
2014, but was valued at about $1.9 billion at IPO. Id.; Cromwell 
Schubarth, Cloudera Raises $225M in IPO that Tops Target but Slashes 
Valuation, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Apr. 28, 2017, 6:20 AM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2017/04/27/cloudera-raises-
225m-in-ipo-that-tops-targets-but.html/ [perma.cc/4XRG-8RSD]. 
263 See discussion supra Section II.C and accompanying notes 
describing Chesbrough’s framework. 
264 See discussion supra Section II.C and accompanying notes 
detailing the different rationales for structuring a CVC in a particular 
manner. In a study done in 2013, the discrepancy between CVCs and 
venture capital firms was stark. “[In 2013], [c]orporate venturing unit 
leaders on average earn[ed] $304,250 a year, with a further $164,865 as 
cash bonus. A similar 2012 survey by bank JPMorgan and J 
Thelander Consulting found the top-ranking financial venture capitalist 
(VC) at a firm managing less than $1bn earned $541,329 on average in the 
2011-12 period with a bonus of $868,092.” James Mawson, Spotlight on 
Compensation, GLOBAL CORP. VENTURING (Sept. 9, 2013), 
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Capital has good standing in the reputation market because 
venture capital funds believe they are dealing with a known 
quantity given the involvement of Intel Capital in a high 
number of deals over a few decades’ time. 
C. Acre Venture Partners Case Study 
The food industry is undergoing tremendous change right 
now—some even say a revolution.265 Every year, an 
increasing number of new products proliferate in the 
marketplace.266 The dollar amount that corporate venture 
capital invested in the consumer packaged goods (“CPG”) 
space increased by a multiple of eight from 2011 to 2015 and 
well-known corporate players play a significant role.267 More 
 
http://www.globalcorporateventuring.com/article.php/6966/spotlight-on-
compensation/ [perma.cc/AS2V-ZWTJ].  
265 “‘The food industry is in a time of revolution,’ said Campbell Soup 
President and CEO Denise Morrison.” Brian Sozzi, Amid Food Revolution, 
Campbell Starts $125 Million Venture Fund, THESTREET (Feb. 17, 2016, 
1:08 PM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/13461909/1/amid-food-
revolution-campbell-soup-starts-125-million-venture-fund.html/ 
[perma.cc/Y2P2-A6KL]. “Referring to the packaged-food industry as being 
in the middle of a ‘period of revolutionary change,’ Chief Executive Officer 
Denise Morrison . . . cited major cultural changes, changes in the size of 
American households, and a growing movement toward simpler foods and 
organics.” Brian Sozzi, Campbell’s Soup CEO: “I Have Never Seen Industry 
Conditions Like Today,” THESTREET (July 22, 2015, 7:36 PM), 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/13227872/1/campbells-soup-ceo-i-have-
never-seen-industry-conditions-like-today.html/ [perma.cc/XQ2H-PZZ7].  
266 See CB INSIGHTS WEBINAR: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF 
CONSUMER PACKAGED GOODS: WHAT’S CHANGING TODAY, WHO’S DOING IT, 
AND WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS slide 40 (2016), 
http://www.slideshare.net/CBInsights/the-changing-landscape-of-
consumer-packaged-goods/ [perma.cc/VN3M-YPXV] [hereinafter CB 
INSIGHTS WEBINAR] (graph showing increase in new food and non-food 
products in the consumer packaged goods space). 
267 Big CPG Corporates: Where They’re Investing in Food, Personal 
Care, Tech, and More, CB INSIGHTS (Apr. 25, 2016), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/consumer-packaged-goods-startup-bets/ 
[perma.cc/L7RY-GWVQ] (mentioning Coca-Cola Company, Unilever, 
General Mills, and Anheuser-Busch as active investors in and acquirers of 
private companies with a quarter of the investments in private companies 
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than $6 billion in funding has been invested in 400 food 
startups since 2010.268 Unsurprisingly, the top acquirers of 
these startups are large corporations.269  
To cite one example of this change, this Article will 
discuss how Campbell Soup Company, a New Jersey 
corporation (“Campbell Soup”), became involved in corporate 
venture capital. In an attempt to innovate in the ever-
competitive CPG space, Campbell Soup launched fourteen 
new products (both beverages and dressings) under its 
Bolthouse Farms brand in the spring of 2015, and also 
announced plans to expand its 1915 organic fresh pressed 
juice brand.270 In August 2015, Campbell Soup launched 
three new organic, non-genetically modified chicken noodle 
varieties aimed at kids.271 Despite these efforts to make 
themselves relevant, Campbell Soup decided that it needed 
to innovate in a different way.  
In February 2016, Campbell Soup announced the 
formation of Acre Venture Partners, a Delaware limited 
partnership (“Acre Venture Partners”), intending to make 
venture capital investments in innovative new companies in 
food and food-related industries. Campbell Finance 2 Corp., 
an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Campbell, is the sole 
 
by these players to seed, angel, or Series A rounds and sixty mergers and 
acquisition transactions from 2011 to 2015). 
268 Annie Gasparro, Campbell Invests $125 Million in Project to Fund 
Food Startups, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2016, 9:09 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/campbell-invests-125-million-in-project-to-
fund-food-startups-1455750400/ [perma.cc/9U3Z-TQNC]. 
269 CB INSIGHTS WEBINAR, supra note 266, at slide 19. Note that 
innovation in the CPG space does not come from R&D; compared to 
advertising costs, R&D is a small expenditure. Id. at slide 28. 
Interestingly, CPG corporates (not necessarily CVCs) increasingly 
invested in CPG startups in 2014, 2015 and Q1 ‘16 once non-CPG 
corporates such as GV and Comcast Ventures did so. CPG Is Still Hot: 
100+ Deals in Q1’16, Corporates Participate More, CB INSIGHTS (May 15, 
2016), https://www.cbinsights.com/reasearch/cpg-startup-financing-q1-
2016/ [https://perma.cc/S5QY-7C7G]. 
270 Sozzi, Amid Food Revolution, supra note 265. 
271 Sozzi, Campbell’s Soup CEO, supra note 265. 
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limited partner of Acre Venture Partners.272 Under 
Chesbrough’s framework, Campbell Soup makes driving 
investments meaning that its investments in CPG startups 
are tightly linked to its strategic and operational goals. 
Acre Ventures GP, manages Acre Venture Partners, 
which is independent of Campbell Soup.273 Jeff Dunn, 
president of the company’s Campbell Fresh division, is the 
Campbell Soup representative on the investment committee 
of Acre.274 Campbell Soup agreed to make a $125 million 
capital commitment to Acre Venture Partners.275  
Acre Venture Partners has made multiple recent 
investments. As an example, it invested $40 million in the 
later stage Series C round of Farmer’s Business Network, an 
analytic and data management company for farms. It also 
invested $20 million in the early stage round of Evolve 
BioSystems, a provider of microbiome-based products.276 
By creating a corporate venture capital arm, Campbell 
Soup is positioning itself to be a part of the food revolution 
for healthier foods. General Mills, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation277 and a competitor of Campbell Soup, had 
started developing newer products through one of its 
business units, 301 Inc., to address consumers’ desire for 
healthy foods. Ultimately, however, 301 Inc. shifted its focus 
 
272 Sozzi, Amid Food Revolution, supra note 265. 
273 Id.  
274 Id.  
275 Id. See also Campbell Soup Company, Quarterly Report (Form 10-
Q) (June 7, 2016), at 20, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/16732/000001673216000124/cpb-512016x10q.htm [perma.cc/UU3N-
NTZ5] (noting that through May 1, 2016, Campbell Soup funded $26 
million of the $125 million capital commitment and that the company has 
no further financial obligations to Acre Venture Partners except for the 
remaining $99 million). 
276 See Acre Venture Partners, PITCHBOOK, 
https://my.pitchbook.com/#page/profile_1981226419 (on file with author). 
277 See generally General Mills, Annual Report (Form 10-K)  
(July 6, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40704/ 
000119312515245476/d947722d10k.htm [perma.cc/7Q2P-EX2Y] 
(highlighting material information regarding General Mills). 
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away from internal R&D to investments in regional 
startups.278 Kellogg Company also recently launched a “food 
tech-focused venture fund” called Eighteen94 Capital.279  
Notably, despite the fact that Campbell Soup, Kellogg, 
and General Mills all largely focus on making investments in 
traditional food startups, each differed in the manner in 
which they set up their corporate venture capital arms. In 
October 2016, Campbell Soup became the sole investor in 
Habit, a nutrition-focused startup that tailors personal 
nutrition recommendations based on a person’s body 
biology.280 This new investment deviates from how Campbell 
 
278 In July 2015, General Mills implemented a new strategy for one of 
its business units, 301 Inc. See John Kell, General Mills Is Starting a VC 
for Food Startups, FORTUNE (Oct. 22, 2015, 8:34 AM), 
http://fortune.com/2015/10/22/general-mills-vc-small-food [perma.cc/ 
4KLM-67KZ]. 301 Inc. had existed for three years and was originally 
intended to develop small, disruptive brands internally—now, the plan is 
for 301 Inc. to invest in small regional startups that seek capital to grow. 
See id. John Haugen, vice president and general manager of 301 Inc. 
stated, “We have found that more and more innovation was coming from 
small companies . . . . There were ways for us to partner and provide 
growth capital.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). There are three factors 
that will be considered by 301 Inc. when it considers whether to invest in a 
startup: (1) gives General Mills an opportunity to compete in new 
categories; (2) allows certain deals to be structured in a way that would 
allow General Mills to acquire the startup in the future; and (3) meets 
certain financial metrics and goals. See id. (author noted that being an 
early investor and nurturing the brand of a startup is much cheaper than 
having to pay hefty price tags on acquisitions such as General Mills’ 
acquisition of the natural food company, Annie’s, for $820 million in 2014). 
279 E-mail Newsletter from Marcelo Ballve, Research Director, CB 
Insights, to CB Insights subscribers (June 24, 2016, 11:26 AM) (on file 
with author).  
280 John Kell, Campbell Soup Invests in Nutrition Tech Startup, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 26, 2016, 2:23 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/10/26/campbell-
soup-invests-habit/ [perma.cc/4B8P-MKZ3]. Habit “uses data from an at-
home test kit to make personalized food recommendations tailored to an 
individual’s unique DNA.” Id. Denise Morrison, Campbell CEO and 
President, said, “Campbell’s investment is part of our broader efforts to 
define the future of food, which requires fresh thinking, new models of 
innovation, smart external development, and venture investing to create 
an ecosystem of innovative partners.” Id. 
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Soup’s competitors are investing. In addition, Campbell Soup 
invested right off of its balance sheet rather than through its 
CVC arm.281 This indicates a shift away from a driving 
investment model to one that may be more appropriately 
characterized as emergent. Put differently, Campbell Soup is 
trying to predict where future trends may be headed so that 
it can position itself to pivot accordingly. 
The structure of Campbell’s corporate venture capital 
arm is distinctly different than the other CVCs mentioned so 
far. First, although Acre Venture Partners is funded by 
Campbell Soup, a general partner outside of the parent 
company, Acre Ventures GP, manages the fund.282 Second, 
the sole limited partner of Acre Venture Partners is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Campbell Soup.283 The structure 
suggests that Campbell Soup284 may want to operate in 
stealth mode as it makes investments in private 
companies—at least until it strategically makes sense for the 
parent company to do otherwise. Note 15 to the Consolidated 
Financial Statements in Campbell Soup’s Form 10-K for the 
year ended July 31, 2016 provides details on its $125 million 
capital commitment to Acre. It states that Campbell Soup’s 
“share of earnings (loss) is calculated according to the terms 
of the partnership agreement. Acre is a [variable interest 
entity].”285 Campbell Soup characterizes the third-party 
ownership as a noncontrolling interest.286 As is the case with 
the previous examples, the parent company reports very 
 
281 In doing CVC research, it was never made clear why certain 
companies invested off their balance sheets versus a stand-alone corporate 
venture capital arm.  
282 Campbell Soup Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K)  
(Sept. 20, 2016), at 62, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/16732/000001673216000146/cpb-7312016x10xk.htm [perma.cc/C8KD-
B4C2] [hereinafter Campbell Soup Co. Form 10-K]. 
283 Id. 
284 As of February 16, 2018, Campbell Soup Company had a market 
cap of $13.879 billion. Campbell Soup Company (CPB), YAHOO! FINANCE,  
http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=CPB [perma.cc/8RYZ-HDW7]. 
285 See Campbell Soup Co. Form 10-K, supra note 282, at 62. 
286 See id.  
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basic information about its corporate venture capital 
investment activity. The only way one may glean that 
information is to read information from non-publicly 
available sources or information on media websites.  
Based on the limited information available about Acre 
Venture Partners in both the media and public filings, as 
well as its relative newness, this particular CVC illustrates 
how the lack of public knowledge about it may stymie its 
efforts to be part of the venture capital landscape. It has no 
reputation market other than one based on its parent 
company, Campbell Soup Company, and there is not enough 
information for either an entrepreneur or venture capital 
fund to determine whether it will stage its investments. One 
can surmise, however, that unless Campbell Soup puts more 
money into Acre Venture Partners or makes bigger bets on 
the startups it does invest in, it will be relegated to a minor 
role. Therefore, its impact on private ordering may be 
minimal. 
D. Well Ventures Case Study 
Well Ventures, a Delaware LLC (“Well Ventures”), is a 
subsidiary of Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. 
(“Walgreens”),287 “a global pharmacy-led health and 
wellbeing enterprise.”288 Well Ventures either has board or 
 
287 Walgreens Boots Alliance, Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex.-21 
(Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1618921/ 
000114036116083198/ex21.htm [perma.cc/57PQ-THCN] [hereinafter 
Walgreens Form 10-K]. 
288 Id. at 59. There are three different segments of its operations: 
Retail Pharmacy USA, Retail Pharmacy International and Pharmaceutical 
Wholesale. See id. at Section 19, Segment Reporting, for additional 
discussion. By way of background, “[o]n December 31, 2014, Walgreens 
Boots Alliance became the successor of Walgreen Co. (‘Walgreens’) 
pursuant to a merger designed to effect a reorganization of Walgreens into 
a holding company structure (the ‘Reorganization’).” Id. at 54. As a result, 
“Walgreens became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Walgreens Boots 
Alliance, a newly-formed Delaware corporation, and each issued and 
outstanding share of Walgreens common stock, par value $0.078125, 
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observer seats in its portfolio companies and typically invests 
up to $5 million in such companies.289 Under Chesbrough’s 
framework, Walgreens engages in driving investments 
because its investments are tightly linked to its operations 
and strategies. It prefers to exit within four to eight years.290 
While there are vague references to strategic investments, 
Well Ventures291 is not mentioned in Walgreen’s Form 10-K 
or Form 10-Q.292 Instead, the only potential reference to Well 
Ventures is that Walgreens invests in businesses that are 
complementary to its own businesses or that can further its 
growth strategies.293 The Form 10-K then states that these 
 
converted on a one-to-one basis into Walgreens Boots Alliance common 
stock, par value $0.01.” Id. 
289 Company Overview of Well Ventures, BLOOMBERG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId
=266098258 [perma.cc/2FPX-GYMB].  
290 See id. 
291 Founded in 2009, Well Ventures is described as “the venture and 
growth capital investment arm of Walgreen Co.” with a focus on being “the 
preeminent strategic investor and partner for companies with disruptive 
technologies, products, and services that align with Walgreens’ mission 
to ‘help people get, stay, and live well.’” Walgreens: Well 
Ventures, https://web.archive.org/web/20151025144221/http://www.walgre
ens.com/topic/well-ventures/well-ventures-info.jsp (archived Oct. 25, 
2015) (emphasis omitted).  
292 See generally Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., Quarterly Report 
(Form 10-Q) (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/1618921/000161892117000026/wba-2017228x10q.htm/ [perma.cc/ 
A3WR-47BG]; Walgreens Form 10-K, supra note 288. 
293 The full text of the relevant section reads: 
Our growth strategy is partially dependent upon 
acquisitions, joint ventures and other strategic 
investments, some of which may not prove to be successful. 
We have grown, in part, through acquisitions in recent 
years and expect to continue to acquire or invest in 
businesses that build on or are deemed complementary to 
our existing businesses or further our growth strategies. . . 
Acquisitions, joint ventures and strategic investments 
involve numerous other risks, including potential exposure 
to unknown liabilities, as well as undetected internal 
control, regulatory or other issues, or additional costs not 
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strategic investments involve risk and may materially 
adversely affect Walgreens business operations, financial 
condition or results of operations.294  
As is the case with the other public companies discussed, 
Walgreens has a significant market cap—$75.801 billion.295 
Well Ventures has not publicly disclosed the funds allocated 
to it by Walgreens.296 In addition, one cannot merely look at 
the dollar amount to determine what type of influence or 
impact the CVC is having on the parent company as a whole. 
Well Ventures differs from GV and Acre Venture Partners in 
that it is a subsidiary of Walgreens (like Intel Capital). The 
venture capital portfolio of Well Ventures has over a dozen 
companies across its focus areas; however, for “strategic 
reasons,” Well Ventures does not publicize all of them.297 If a 
 
anticipated at the time the transaction was completed. No 
assurance can be given that our acquisitions, joint ventures 
and other strategic investments will be successful and will 
not materially adversely affect our business operations, 
financial condition or results of operations.  
Walgreens Form 10-K, supra note 287, at 10 (emphasis omitted). 
294 See id. 
295 Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., YAHOO! FINANCE (Jan. 30, 2017), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=WBA [perma.cc/FUD2-2MUC]. 
296  Despite thorough research into the amount allocated to Well 
Ventures, the author was unable to locate this information. 
297 See Company Overview of Well Ventures, BLOOMBERG, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapI
d=266098258 [perma.cc/TYB7-CZB5]. Bloomberg lists the types of 
startups Well Ventures has invested in. It also notes Well Ventures’ 
typical investment and exit strategy. The web page does not, however, list 
the amount of Well Ventures’ investment. “[Well Ventures’] portfolio 
companies include such ventures as the creator of a consumer sleep apnea 
device, and a solar energy company that specializes in the energy needs of 
multi-site retailers.” Jeremy Quittner, What’s Really Driving the Boom in 
Corporate VC Firms, INC.COM (Aug. 8th, 2014),  
http://www.inc.com/jeremy-quittner/corporate-venture-capital-drives-
innovation-for-big-companies.html [perma.cc/4RUV-CSQH]. Well Ventures 
can be the lead for a financing or part of a syndicate; they prefer co-
investing with institutional investors that they collaborate with. 
Evaluation Criteria, WALGREENS: WELL VENTURES, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20151026172717/http://www.walgreens.com/to
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deal is admittedly strategic to (presumably) the parent 
company, then it logically follows that the investments Well 
Ventures makes could potentially play a critical role for 
Walgreens and are therefore material. In Walgreens’ Form 
10-K for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2016, there is a 
reference to equity investments in other companies in its 
“Risk Factors” section. “From time to time, we make debt or 
equity investments in other companies that we may not 
control or over which we may not have sole control.”298 It 
also acknowledges the risks of operating in businesses that 
differ from their primary lines of business or which operate 
in different geographic markets.299 Furthermore, Walgreens 
states that it relies on the internal controls and financial 
reporting controls of these companies in which, they have 
non-controlling interests and that such entities “failure to 
maintain effectiveness or comply with applicable standards 
may materially and adversely affect [them].”300  
Like Acre Venture Partners, Well Ventures is a relative 
newcomer to venture capital financings. From a private 
ordering perspective, it appears that its stated exit goals are 
somewhat in the timeframe of a venture capital fund since it 
intends to exit within four to eight years (in contrast to seven 
to ten for the venture capital fund). From a compensation 
perspective, those that invest on behalf of Well Ventures 
may receive carried interest since that is typically why CVCs 
are structured as wholly-owned subsidiaries.301 This type of 
compensation would also align the incentives between Well 
Ventures and the venture capital fund. Since it takes both 
board observer and board seats, Well Ventures’ impact on its 
portfolio companies will differ in terms of impact. A seat on 
 
pic/well-ventures/evaluation-criteria.jsp [perma.cc/6YXL-849P] (archived 
Oct. 26, 2015). For each portfolio company, Well Ventures requests board 
observer seats. Id. 
298 Walgreens Form 10-K, supra note 287, at 15. 
299 Id.  
300 Id.  
301 See discussion supra Section II.C and accompanying notes 
(specifying the rationale behind the different legal structures of CVCs). 
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the board gives Well Ventures a vote in the portfolio 
company whereas being a board observer only gives it access 
to certain financial information which is based on the terms 
of the Investors’ Rights Agreement. Through a designated 
board member, Well Ventures would have a greater impact 
on the control aspect of private ordering. It would be more 
involved in monitoring the company, and, perhaps, it would 
provide nonfinancial assistance to help the company to move 
forward—whether in the form of marketing or offering 
expertise in a particular area that is beneficial to the 
portfolio company. 
E. General Motors Ventures Case Study 
The year 2015 was a record year for financing deals for 
automotive-related startups.302 Funding increased by 154 
percent and deals saw a jump of fifty-eight percent.303 In 
2016, funding to the sector continued unabated and saw 
another increase. The amount of investments into private 
companies in the auto tech space in 2016 totaled $1.102 
 
302 Big Auto’s Startup Bets: Where They’re Investing Across AI, 
Mapping, Automation, and Materials, CB INSIGHTS (May 11, 2016), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/auto-corporates-investing-startups/ 
[perma.cc/2YEA-ZQXU]. Major automakers are playing defense as 
startups encroach on their territory. See E-mail Newsletter from Kerry 
Wu, Auto Tech Industry Analyst, CB Insights, to Auto Tech Insights by 
CB Insights subscribers (July 14, 2016, 7:29 PM) (on file with author). 
Companies are fighting back by actively investing in autotech startups 
through CVCs or the parent companies themselves to the tune of $450 
million as of June 2016. See id. A record-breaking year in investments is a 
strong possibility if the current pace of investment continues. 
303 Foot on the Gas: 2015 Sets Record for Deals in Auto Tech, CB 
INSIGHTS (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/auto-tech-
startups-funding-2015/ [perma.cc/9NG4-47XA]. Autotech startups were on 
a record-breaking pace for funding. For the first half of 2016, $450 million 
was invested in this area. Recently, one of General Motors’ rivals, Ford, 
invested $6.6 million in a startup. Gina Hall, Autotech Startups Set a 
Record Pace for Funding in 2016, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J.: TECHFLASH 
(July 18, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/blog/ 
techflash/2016/07/autotech-startups-set-a-record-pace-for-funding.html 
[perma.cc/CLY7-MPUE]. 
2018.2_FAN_FINAL  
No. 2:341] CATCHING DISRUPTION 405 
 
billion.304 By May 2017, investments surpassed that amount, 
with forty-nine deals equaling $1.307 billion.305  
In order to secure their own futures while simultaneously 
addressing challenges such as the rise of electric vehicles 
and driverless cars, major auto manufacturers have become 
active investors in venture capital deals.306 General Motors 
Company, a Delaware corporation (“General Motors”),307 like 
much of the auto industry, is in a transformative time. It is 
moving from manufacturing and selling cars to the business 
of mobility.308 
In 2010, General Motors established a Delaware 
subsidiary, General Motors Ventures LLC (“GM 
Ventures”)309 for the purpose of pursuing venture capital 
investments in the automotive cleantech, infotainment, 
advanced materials, and other automotive-related 
technologies.310 As of June 2017, GM Ventures had made 
thirty-two investments and used almost ninety percent of its 
 
304 CB INSIGHTS, THE STATE OF AUTO TECH 10 (2017), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/reports/CB-Insights_Auto-Tech-Trends-
2017.pdf [perma.cc/XY5R-RQVG]. 
305 Id. 
306 See Foot on the Gas, supra note 303. 
307 General Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex. 21  
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467858/ 
000146785817000028/ex-21x12312016.htm [perma.cc/HC6H-FKX3]. 
308 Erin Griffith, Driven in the Valley: The Startup Founders Fueling 
GM’s Future, FORTUNE (Sept. 22, 2016, 6:30 AM), 
http://fortune.com/cruise-automation-general-motors-driverless-cars/ 
[perma.cc/BAN8-QHP6]. Startups don’t “adapt well to the politics of slow-
moving, risk-averse corporations. Once their life’s work begins to feel like 
a job, a switch goes off in their brains. Some leave to start their next 
company. Others ‘vest in peace.’ Whatever innovative thing they built gets 
lost inside a giant corporate overlord.” Id. 
309 General Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex. 21  
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467858/ 
000146785817000028/ex-21x12312016.htm [perma.cc/HC6H-FKX3]. 
310 See About Us, GM VENTURES L.L.C., 
http://www.gmventures.com/about/index.jsp [perma.cc/2XKY-Y6LS]. 
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$200 million fund.311 Under Chesbrough’s framework, 
General Motors’ investments would be characterized as both 
enabling and emergent investments. In other words, General 
Motors is strategically investing and innovating in areas 
that it anticipates will affect the future direction of the 
automotive industry. General Motors and its corporate 
venture capital arm, GM Ventures, have been the most 
active of the automotive manufacturers in making 
investments.312 Their investments range from early stage to 
late stage, and the fund has eight professionals.313 General 
Motors, like Campbell Soup, also makes investments 
directly.314 In January 2016, it served as the sole investor in 
a $500 million Series F financing for Lyft.315 In describing its 
venture capital investments, General Motors has a line item 
for private equity and debt investments316 in its Form 10-K 
for the year ended December 31, 2016, which notes $546 
million in this category, compared to $529 million for the 
year before—an increase of almost $20 million.317 It is 
 
311 There was $14.90 million in dry powder as of June 10, 2017. 
General Motors Ventures, PITCHBOOK, https://my-pitchbook-com 
/#page/profile_1820009183 [perma.cc/4YEZ-NBY4] [hereinafter General 
Motors PitchBook Report]. 
312 Big Auto’s Startup Bets, supra note 302. 
313 See id. But cf. About Us, GM VENTURES L.L.C., 
http://www.gmventures.com/about/index.jsp [perma.cc/4YEZ-NBY4] 
(listing only five investment professionals). 
314 See General Motors Company, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q)  
(Apr. 21, 2016), at 19, 21, 32, 33, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1467858/000146785816000317/gm2016q1.htm [perma.cc/ 
WTR2-7MSL] (noting General Motor’s $500 million investment in Lyft). 
315 General Motors PitchBook Report, supra note 311. 
316 “Private equity and debt investments consist of investments in 
private equity and debt funds. These investments provide exposure to and 
benefit from long-term equity investments in private companies, including 
leveraged buy-outs, venture capital and distressed debt strategies.” 
General Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467858/000146785817000028/g
m201610k.htm [perma.cc/KH3S-4PJ4] [hereinafter General Motors Form 
10-K]. 
317 See id. 
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difficult to ascertain whether GM Ventures is included as 
part of that number since there are no specific references to 
it. In the “Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements” of 
the Form 10-K, there is also a brief reference to venture 
capital: “Private equity and debt investments primarily 
consist of investments in private equity and debt funds. 
These investments provide exposure to and benefit from 
long-term equity investments in private companies, 
including leveraged buy-outs, venture capital and distressed 
debt strategies.”318 References to GM Ventures or venture 
capital do not appear anywhere in the 2016 annual or 
quarterly reports of General Motors. No references are made 
to General Motors’ venture capital activities in its proxy 
statement either.319 As was the case with Campbell Soup 
and Walgreens, information about General Motors’ CVC 
activity is available in the media and paid resources. 
However, in the SEC filings of General Motors itself, very 
little is reported. General Motors differs from the other 
examples in that it makes CVC investments through both 
the parent company and GM Ventures. 
This Part discussed CVCs from five different industries at 
various stages of development in order to assess how CVC 
impacts private ordering in venture capital financings. From 
this discussion, three main themes emerged. First, the 
investment rhythm of CVCs did not always align with 
venture capital funds because it was not motivated by 
limited partners or exits. This affects both the staged 
financing and exit components of private ordering. Second, 
there are potentially more conflicts of interests with CVCs 
than venture capital funds because CVCs may invest in the 
same space that their parent companies are in. As a result, 
the implicit contracts of private ordering may be in jeopardy. 
Lastly, the limited information available about CVCs and 
the fact that many of them are newcomers may make them 
 
318 Id. at 72. 
319 See General Motors Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Sched. 14A) 
(Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467858 
/000130817916000367/lgm2016_def14a.htm [perma.cc/ A6DM-47VY]. 
2018.2_FAN_FINAL  
408 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
 
difficult to assess from a reputation market standpoint of 
private ordering. This reputation market would be difficult 
to ascertain from both the perspective of the venture capital 
fund which may consider syndicating with them and the 
entrepreneur who wants to raise money from them. 
IV. SOLUTIONS TO CVC CHALLENGES TO 
PRIVATE ORDERING 
The advent of CVC has complicated the VC landscape. 
Because CVCs are not motivated purely by financial gain as 
traditional VC firms are, and many may be new to the 
startup scene, there will inevitably be growing pains. The 
private ordering structure that has worked well for so long 
within a two-player system now needs to adapt to 
accommodate CVC, which is now an influential third player 
in the venture capital landscape.  
Part IV addresses the challenges that CVCs pose in 
private ordering and proposes possible solutions. One 
challenge is that CVCs, particularly ones who are new to VC 
investing and have not worked with entrepreneurs or early 
stage companies, may adversely impact staged financings 
and the ability of the portfolio company to go public or be 
acquired. Structuring CVCs in a way that encourages them 
to take a closer look at financial considerations is one way to 
tackle this issue. A second challenge is conflicts of interest. 
This Article recommends increased vigilance and a best 
practices framework. Finally, a third challenge is that CVCs 
typically do not have the reputation capital that traditional 
venture capital firms do. To address this issue, the parent 
companies of CVCs can voluntarily disclose more 
information about their CVC activities in their public 
company filings to earn a reputation for being more 
transparent. By offering transparency where none is 
required, the parent companies of CVCs can begin to build 
trust.  
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A. Investment Rhythm and Lack of Exits 
Although staged financings are still the norm, CVCs—
especially those that are less well-established—tend to 
invest in either the earlier or later stages of the company. 
CVCs may also come into the deal at unexpected points, like 
Intel Capital did with Cloudera, and drive up the valuation 
of a company.320 In the case of Cloudera, when the company 
went public, it was worth less than it was in its Series F 
financing.321 Furthermore, because of their deep pockets, 
CVCs may invest more money than expected, which leads to 
the problem of private companies staying private longer.322  
As this Article points out in various Parts, there is a 
growing interest in the innovation that occurs outside of 
large corporations. There is a limited amount of R&D that 
corporations can do in-house and even when R&D is done 
internally, it may languish because of internal politics. 
Corporations use their CVC arms to create a pipeline of 
potential new acquisition targets or to understand the new 
direction of cutting-edge technologies. Therefore, in order to 
be accepted as a serious player in the venture capital 
ecosystem, new CVCs cannot dabble in investing, but need to 
stage their financings to mirror that of successful venture 
capital funds.  
Additionally, economic realities may push CVCs to act in 
a way that follows private ordering principles. Therefore, 
although the investments by venture capital funds and CVCs 
are now skewed toward early or later stage startups, it is 
still staged in that the company raises money, and the 
interests of the venture capital fund and CVCs align around 
 
320 See discussion supra Section III.B and accompanying notes for 
more information about Intel Capital. 
321 See text supra Section III.B about Intel Capital’s investment in 
Cloudera and the startup’s subsequent IPO. 
322 “[T]he median time to exit for venture-backed companies is now 
8.2 years for an IPO and five years for acquisitions, the highest level in a 
decade.” Newsletter from Erin Griffith, Senior Writer, Fortune, to 
Fortune: Term Sheet subscribers (May 24, 2017, 6:57 AM) (on file with 
author). 
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the timing of the investment over time. If the entrepreneur 
is unable to raise money in the middle stage of the startup’s 
life cycle, the money to run it may run out, and there will be 
a consolidation of the startups that succeed and the ones 
that fail—that is simply the nature of this business. 
Therefore, from a practical perspective, instead of being 
preoccupied about the unevenness of staged financings, the 
concerns of portfolio companies will shift to whether to 
accept the terms of a down round or the ability to get funding 
not only from a CVC but anyone at all. To cite one example, 
if unicorns fail to go public or they get too big to acquire, they 
will need to succeed as a private company or go out of 
business. Even the most highly valued unicorn, Uber,323 has 
faced problems. It generated severe backlash following its 
recent litigation with Waymo,324 its Greyball program,325 
and allegations of sexual harassment.326  
 
323 The Unicorn List: Current Private Companies Valued at $1B and 
Above, CB INSIGHTS (updated daily), https://www.cbinsights.com/research-
unicorn-companies [perma.cc/AK4M-ZUZZ]. 
324 Complaint, Waymo, LLC v. Uber Technologies Inc., et al.,  
No. 3:17-cv-00939, 2017 WL 726994 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2017).  
325 Greyball is an initiative that “uses data collected from the Uber 
app and other techniques to identify and circumvent officials who were 
trying to clamp down on the ride-hailing service.” Mike Isaac, How Uber 
Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-
evade-authorities.html. 
326 Biz Carson, An Ex-Uber Employee Claims He Was Fired for 
Reporting Sexual Harassment, BUS. INSIDER: TECH. INSIDER (May 18, 2017, 
9:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ex-uber-employee-claims-fired-
reporting-sexual-harassment-2017-5 [perma.cc/83W6-Y5MJ]; Yuki 
Noguchi, Uber Fires 20 Employees After Sexual Harassment Claim 
Investigation, NPR (June 6, 2017, 6:57 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/06/531806891/uber-fires-
20-employees-after-sexual-harassment-claim-investigation 
[perma.cc/XG4C-LB6V]; Craig Timberg & Brian Fung, Uber CEO Travis 
Kalanick Takes Leave amid Sweeping Changes at the Company, WASH. 
POST (June 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2017/06/13/eric-holder-report-on-harassment-at-uber-calls-for-
new-corporate-culture/ [perma.cc/TXD2-DWDD]; ERIC HOLDER & TAMMY 
ALBARRÁN, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UBER (2017), 
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Experts also agree that the lack of IPOs and acquisitions 
is harmful to the economy.327 CVCs can address this issue by 
having frank discussions with their venture capital fund 
counterparts to determine if going public or getting acquired 
is in the best interest of the various constituencies in the 
venture capital deal: the entrepreneur, the venture capital 
firm, and the CVC. Granted, CVCs are not focused on exits 
because they do not have the pressures of limited partners 
who expect a hefty return on their investment through the 
investment decisions made by the general partner. However, 
this Article suggests—and evidence has shown—that CVCs 
can be convinced to allow portfolio companies to go public if 
the IPO is a lucrative one (or at least has the promise of 
being one, as in the case of Snap).328 The pent-up demand for 
IPOs can be used to stimulate exits as well. In order to 
increase the number of exits, CVCs should also have similar 
compensation structures to venture capital funds so that the 
general partners will benefit from an exit in the form of 
carried interest. Currently, there are many different legal 
structures for CVCs. The most prominent is the single LP-
owned fund. In reality, ninety-nine percent of the company is 
owned by the LP (the parent corporation of the CVC) and the 
 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3863808/Read-Holder-report-
recommendations-for-Uber.pdf [perma.cc/JVS7-MGX9].  
327 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 172. 
328 The Snap IPO was initially hailed as a success; it “closed its first 
day of trading up 44 percent from its initial offering price of $17.” Edmund 
Lee, Snap’s IPO Was a Success. Now It Has to Prove It’s Not Twitter, 
RECODE (Mar. 2, 2017, 4:43 PM), https://www.recode.net/ 
2017/3/2/14795366/snaps-ipo-was-a-success [perma.cc/XG8H-XYV5]. 
Shortly after, Snap announced a $2.2 billion lost in its first quarter, 
causing the value of its shares to drop and potentially sending a warning 
signal to other unicorns looking to go public. See Katie Benner, Snap’s $2.2 
Billion Loss Caps Bumpy First Months as a Public Company, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/technology/snap-
earnings.html  
[perma.cc/7QA9-EME6]; Katie Benner, In Snap Inc.’s Tumble, Start-Ups 
See a Warning from Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/technology/snap-public-company-
start-ups.html [perma.cc/7C2A-8NBF]. 
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remaining one percent is owned by the general partners. 
However, the fund is commonly referred to as a wholly-
owned subsidiary. This legal structure is typical of how 
venture capital funds are run. In other words, encouraging 
carried interest for general partners in CVCs will incentivize 
CVCs to take their portfolio companies public and look at 
merger and acquisition opportunities. This structure also has 
the added benefit of the CVC being able to reinvest any 
monies earned into other CVC arms of the parent company 
so that like the venture capital funds, there is a cyclical 
rhythm to how the money is deployed. 
B. Board Matters 
This Article has suggested following a staged financing 
model to mimic venture capital funds (albeit in a slightly 
skewed form where money is clustered in the early or later 
stages of a startup) and considering exit strategies more 
seriously. Now, this Article turns to the control element of 
private ordering. Under private ordering, there are certain 
control mechanisms at work to combat issues of uncertainty 
and information asymmetry. This Article argues for more 
vigilance regarding the board observer and board seat 
arrangements in startups with respect to the control that 
CVCs might exert over it through their board designee. It 
also sets forth a best practices framework. The suggested 
best practices for the boards of startups were made to 
address potential conflicts of interest for board members 
designated by CVCs and the need for appropriate financial 
and industry expertise given the increasing complexities of 
startups, which are starting to look more like public 
companies that are operating in the private sphere. As 
discussed in Part II above, with private companies staying 
private longer, in part as a result of increased CVC 
investments, getting the correct board mix is more critical 
than ever to help ensure that the internal controls and 
governance keep pace with the growth of the private 
company. 
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1. Board Observer 
Board observers differ from board members in three 
fundamental ways: (1) there are no board voting rights as an 
observer, (2) observers can be excluded during certain 
discussions, and (3) information rights are contractual. Put 
simply, the rights of an observer are limited by the investors’ 
rights agreement329 and observers do not have fiduciary 
duties like board members do.330 The CVC arm is required to 
have a certain threshold level of shares for the particular 
series of stock it invested in to maintain its observer 
rights.331 An observer designated by the CVC will receive 
notices, minutes, consents, and other materials that are 
provided to the portfolio company’s directors.332 From a 
contractual standpoint, the board observer designated by the 
CVC may, but typically does not, agree to act as a board 
member would (essentially agreeing to be bound to the same 
fiduciary duties as board members), and the portfolio 
company maintains the right to decide whether to exclude 
such board observer from certain meetings for reasons 
related to attorney-client privilege, disclosure of trade 
secrets, or conflict of interest.333 Additionally, the portfolio 
 
329 See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, 
INVESTOR RIGHTS AGREEMENT 22–23, http://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-
documents/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2018). 
330 Sometimes companies choose to include such provisions in a 
management rights letter signed between the company and the particular 
investor receiving such rights. See id. at 23 n.35. A company may also 
request that board observers execute confidentiality agreements since they 
are not subject to the same fiduciary duties as directors. See id. 
331 See id. at 22. 
332 See id. 
333 The relevant language in the investors’ rights agreement states:  
[S]uch representative shall agree to hold in confidence and 
trust and to act in a fiduciary manner with respect to all 
information so provided; and provided further, that the 
Company reserves the right to withhold any information 
and to exclude such representative from any meeting or 
portion thereof if access to such information or attendance 
at such meeting could adversely affect the attorney-client 
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company could choose to exclude the board observer 
designated by the CVC if the CVC’s parent is a competitor of 
the portfolio company.334 
From a best practices standpoint, it would behoove the 
CVC to designate a board observer from a corporate venture 
capital arm that is a subsidiary instead of a corporate 
venture unit that is part of the parent company. Regardless 
of whether a board observer is designated by the CVC that is 
a subsidiary of the parent company or a corporate unit of the 
parent company, CVCs should implement appropriate 
internal confidentiality procedures for such board observers 
to prevent them from disregarding contractual confidential 
provisions with portfolio companies and sharing such 
confidential information broadly within the parent company. 
CVCs should also disclose any potential conflicts early to 
ensure that proper board procedure can be followed—i.e., 
CVC-designated board observers leave the board discussion 
for a certain portion of the meeting—to prevent any hint of 
impropriety.  
Although CVCs have designated more board observers in 
the past, the current trend is for many of them to designate 
board members.335 Ultimately, however, the role such 
individuals play—whether as a board observer or board 
member—depends on the philosophy of the CVC arm of the 
public company and the amount of money it invests in the 
startup. To cite some examples, when American Express 
 
privilege between the Company and its counsel or result in 
disclosure of trade secrets or a conflict of interest, or if such 
Investor or its representative is a competitor of the 
Company.  
Id. at 22–23. 
334 See id. 
335 The top ten CVCs—the top ten being denoted by a CB Insights 
article—often take an active board position in the private companies they 
invest in (versus a more passive board position, such as “board observer”). 
For example, Intel Capital has sixty-four board member seats out of 154 
total current board positions. Intel Capital PitchBook Report, supra note 
258. GV has seventy-five board member seats out of eighty-two current 
board positions. GV PitchBook Report, supra note 222. 
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Ventures participates on a board, it typically designates a 
board observer.336 Intel Capital, in contrast, is much more 
likely to designate a board member.337 
2. Board Member 
Board members designated by CVCs are bound to certain 
fiduciary duties by statute.338 These include the duty of 
loyalty339 and the duty of care.340 There are also other 
 
336 See American Express Ventures, PITCHBOOK, https://my-pitchbook-
com/#page/profile_567803052. 
337 Under the section titled “Top 25 Board Seats” in the PitchBook 
report, Intel Capital had board observer status in only seven of the 
twenty-five seats; the other eighteen were all board memberships. See 
Intel Capital PitchBook Report, supra note 258. 
338 Specifically, this refers to the statutory law of the state of 
incorporation of the company that the CVCs are investing in. For example, 
if the company is incorporated in Delaware, board powers are codified in 
section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. See DEL. CODE tit. 
8, § 141 (2016). 
339 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) 
(“Essentially, the duty of loyalty mandates that the best interest of the 
corporation and its shareholders takes precedence over any interest 
possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared 
by the stockholders generally.”); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) 
(“Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of 
trust and confidence to further their private interests . . . . The rule that 
requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands 
that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.”). 
340 In Delaware, the duty of care is not codified, but has been 
developed in case law, and is separate from the duty of loyalty. See Smith 
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (“[A] director’s duty to 
exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of care, 
as distinguished from a duty of loyalty.”). Under the duty of care, directors 
have a responsibility to “inform themselves, prior to making a business 
decision, of all material information reasonably available to them. Having 
become so informed, they must then act with requisite care in the 
discharge of their duties.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) 
(holding that the duty of care is integral to application of the business 
judgment rule), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 
244 (Del. 2000). 
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duties, such as good faith,341 disclosure,342 and 
confidentiality,343 which CVCs should also bear in mind.344  
Another way to address potential conflicts of interest that 
may arise in the board context in the event that a CVC has 
the right to designate a board member is for the CVC 
to designate an individual not affiliated with the CVC arm in 
any way. Instead, the CVC may designate one of its co-
investors in the syndicate to serve as a board member. Using 
this tactic would serve two purposes: (1) it would ease any 
concerns by entrepreneurs about potential competition from 
the CVC, and (2) the CVC still maintains its right to 
designate a board member. In order for this to work, 
however, it would take a high degree of trust between the 
CVC investor and traditional VC firm investor. 
 
341 The key difference between good faith in the fiduciary duty context 
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Uniform 
Commercial Code context is temporal—the courts analyze the parties’ 
actions at the time of the alleged wrongdoing and review what happened 
in the past to determine the parties’ relationship when the breach 
occurred in the case of the former. With respect to an implied covenant 
claim, the courts examine the time the contract was made and whether the 
parties would have made the decisions they did if the issue discussed arose 
at that time. Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 57 A.3d 400, 418 (Del. 
2013); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 
(Del. 2006). 
342 See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985). 
343 See generally United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) 
(holding that under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, “a 
fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to 
purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and 
confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that 
information”); S.E.C. v. Lyon, 605 F. Supp. 2d 531, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(citing United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(reaffirming that the duty of confidentiality, in the context of securities 
laws, exists “where there is explicit acceptance of a duty of confidentiality 
or where such acceptance may be implied from a similar relationship of 
trust and confidence between the parties”)). 
344 Under Delaware law, board members may choose to be a non-
voting member. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(d) (2016) (“If the certificate of 
incorporation provides that 1 or more directors shall have more or less 
than 1 vote per director on any matter . . . .”). 
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Board members designated by CVCs are not there to 
represent the interest of the parent company. Instead, they 
have legal fiduciary duties to all of the portfolio company’s 
stockholders, and not to the parent company. While this is 
certainly a conflict for board members appointed by 
traditional VC firms, it is a much bigger issue for CVCs 
where the parent’s corporate interests may be misaligned. 
i. Duty of Care 
By reviewing board materials carefully, advocating for 
deliberate review of board actions, voicing support for 
ongoing review of financial controls, seeking the advice and 
counsel of other experts as needed,345 and ensuring the 
accuracy of board minutes and written board actions, a CVC 
board designee can discharge his or her duty of care.346 
 
345 Id. § 141(e). Note that the standard of gross negligence is applied if 
a board is alleged to breach this particular duty. In re Citigroup Inc. 
S’holder Derivative Litig., 964, A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch. 2009). In order to 
succeed on a claim of breach of duty of care against an individual, the 
plaintiff must rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule as to 
the majority of the directors. Hamilton Partners, L.P. v. Highland Capital 
Mgmt., L.P., C.A. No. 6547-VCN, 2014 WL 1813340 (Del. Ch. May 7, 
2014). The court will apply the more stringent standard of entire fairness 
(where the burden shifts to the board of directors to prove the principles of 
fair dealing and fair price) in certain circumstances. See Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.3d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
346 If there is a good faith effort to discharge the duty of care, then the 
business judgment rule applies. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984). If there is not a good faith effort then a more stringent standard 
applies, such as the entire fairness standard. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993). The duty of care focuses more on 
process than substance. See, e.g., In re Trados, 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(in which the court scrutinized the actions of the board of directors in a 
merger action). Note that even if directors breach the duty of care, there is 
a statutory limitation of liability for directors under section 102(b)(7) of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law (which only exculpates directors 
not anyone else). DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2016). Furthermore, there 
are indemnification statutes, such as the one codified in Delaware’s 
General Corporation Law section 145, which allows corporations to 
indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a 
party to any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, 
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Recent court cases out of the Delaware Court of Chancery 
highlight the need to abide by the duty of care.347 For 
example, in In re Rural Metro Corp.,348 the opinion 
illustrates the need for active and engaged directors in any 
sale process, which includes taking steps to ensure that all 
conflicts are identified, disclosed, and discussed.349 Directors 
must be proactive in asking questions about any existing 
potential conflicts, the implications of such conflicts, and how 
they will be addressed.350 Put simply, directors must focus 
on the process of making a decision.351 
 
whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative (other than an 
action by or in the right of the corporation) by reason of the fact that the 
person is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation 
and permits corporations to insure their directors in the event of a breach 
of duty of care. Id. § 145(a). 
347 As alluded to in the discussion in supra note 346, even though 
directors are exculpated pursuant to the section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, financial advisors can still be liable for aiding 
and abetting a breach of the duty of care by the directors. See In re Rural 
Metro Corp. (Rural Metro), 88 A.3d 54, 85–86 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
348 In Rural Metro, the court found that if a “third party knows that 
the board is breaching its duty of care and participates in the breach by 
misleading the board or creating the informational vacuum, then the third 
party can be liable for aiding and abetting.” Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 97.  
349 Id. at 105–06. 
350 See id. 
351 By focusing on the process of making decisions, directors exercise 
their fiduciary duty of care. “Directors should:  
• be active and engaged;  
• obtain access to relevant information;  
• obtain input from relevant board committees and 
board advisors;  
• actively deliberate decisions, asking relevant questions 
and discussing the information provided;  
• examine available alternatives; and  
• resist the pressure for a quick decision.”  
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, WSGR ALERT: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR 
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 1 (2011), https://www.wsgr.com/publications/ 
PDFSearch/wsgralert-board-of-directors-critical-issues.pdf [perma.cc/ 
BK4Z-RDNL]. 
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In the case of CVCs, one example of a potential conflict of 
interest occurs when the startup directly competes with the 
parent company of the CVC. If that is the case, then the CVC 
board designee needs to identify the conflict, disclose the 
nature of the conflict, and discuss appropriate next steps. If 
the startup is contemplating the parent company as a 
potential acquirer, the CVC board designee must recuse 
herself from the decision-making process. Even if the parent 
company is not a possible buyer, the CVC-designated board 
member has a conflict if potential buyers are competitors of 
the parent company. The board minutes of the startup 
should reflect a clear record of the discussions that 
transpired, including a careful review of the facts, steps it 
took to make the decision, and the decision that the board 
made as a result of that deliberation. By taking these steps, 
the board demonstrates a good faith effort to discharge its 
duty of care, as defined above. As a result, should 
stockholders decide to sue the company, the company will be 
subject to the standard of the business judgment rule (where 
the onus is on the stockholder to prove wrongdoing) instead 
of the more stringent standard of entire fairness.352 
A director may be unable to fulfill his or her duty of care 
in any meaningful way depending on the number of boards 
on which he or she serves, since serving on a board of a 
private company typically means that board members meet 
at least once a quarter if not monthly. Therefore, setting a 
limit on the number of boards on which a person can serve 
would be prudent, especially if a CVC arm of a public 
company is big and active like GV is. As the corporate 
venture capital arm of a public company continues to grow, it 
may entail hiring more investment professionals. 
ii. Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty involves protecting confidential 
information and communications by establishing clear 
 
352 See discussion supra note 346. 
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procedures, being aware of potential conflicts of interests353 
for the CVC designee or other directors or their affiliates, 
and ensuring the disclosure of all material facts regarding a 
particular transaction. Furthermore, interested directors 
(whether the CVC designees or others) should limit their 
participation in deliberations or voting regarding a 
transaction. The applicable Delaware statute354 does not 
necessitate the recusal of an interested director provided 
that certain conditions are met, including disclosure of the 
material facts by the director regarding his or her 
relationship or interest to the board of directors or committee 
and the stockholders entitled to vote on the matter.355 In 
addition, the contract must be fair to the corporation at the 
time it is approved by the board, committee, or 
stockholders.356  
The CVC world is especially rife with conflict because, in 
many cases, the parent companies of the CVCs are very 
involved in their management. The board designees from 
CVCs must make decisions in the best interest of all 
stockholders in the company and not solely in the interests of 
the parent companies of the CVCs. This can be a difficult 
line to toe, especially given the various legal ways in which 
CVCs are structured. For example, if CVCs are part of a 
 
353 If there is a conflict of interest in the context of a board decision or 
transaction, directors are not protected by the business judgment rule and 
liability would not be limited by statute. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) 
(2016). Note that conflicts of interest can arise whether the individual 
director has a personal interest or not, such as in the case of a CVC board 
designee who is not serving the interest of the parent company on the 
board but rather owes a duty to all stockholders of the company. 
354 See id. § 144. 
355 See id. § 144(a)(1), (2). Historically, many firms have advised that 
a conflicted board member should be recused from voting, but the author 
has had conversations with attorneys practicing in this area that they 
have increasingly seen Delaware lawyers advising that even conflicted 
board members should vote so long as there is full disclosure. 
356 See id. § 144(a)(3). 
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business unit, as is the case with General Mills,357 the board 
designees of such CVCs are employed by the parent 
companies. In contrast, in the case of CVCs which are 
wholly-owned subsidiaries of parent companies but with 
some level of independent decision-making, there may be a 
layer of autonomy that does not exist when a CVC directly 
reports to the parent company in some way. Therefore, 
although in theory board designees of CVCs should represent 
the interests of all stockholders of the private companies in 
which they invest, CVC board designees may only be 
considering the one that pays the bills—the parent 
companies of the CVCs. 
Despite the potential for conflicts of interest, however, 
there are still good reasons for the entrepreneurs who are 
receiving investments from CVCs to have CVC-designated 
board members. Because board members have fiduciary 
duties, the entrepreneurs can use those duties as a tool if 
CVCs behave badly. For example, if a CVC realizes that its 
portfolio company poses a fundamental business threat to its 
parent company, the CVC board designee could 
hypothetically vote to shutter the company thereby 
potentially acting against the interest of the stockholders of 
the company. At that point, the entrepreneurs and the 
company’s legal counsel could remind the CVC that they 
have fiduciary duties that require them to act in the interest 
of all stockholders. If they fail to adhere to such duties, they 
will increase their chances of being subject to lawsuits in the 
future. 
C. The Reputation Market 
A third challenge with CVCs is that throughout their 
history they have generally been looked upon with disdain 
and suspicion by venture capital funds and, to a lesser 
extent, entrepreneurs as well. This makes it difficult for 
CVCs to meet the reputational aspects of private ordering.  
 
357 See discussion supra Section III.C and accompanying notes (briefly 
describing the structure of General Mills’ corporate venture capital arm).  
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Although the life spans of CVCs have lengthened over 
time, historically they have had shorter life spans than their 
venture capital fund counterparts. Accordingly, CVCs may 
not have a track record of VC deals from which either 
entrepreneurs or venture capital funds can analyze to 
determine whether they would be good partners in a 
financing. Also, unlike successful venture capital funds, 
where the success of one fund has an iterative effect and 
makes it easier to fundraise for future funds, CVCs are 
dependent on their parent companies to continue funding 
their portfolio companies. Lastly, if a CVC has only recently 
joined the VC landscape, its reputation may be based on 
what this Article will characterize as a “reputational halo 
effect” that originates from the brand of the parent company. 
This reputational halo effect may be both good and bad. For 
example, a CVC could cultivate the reputation of being an 
advocate for entrepreneurs by having it more widely known 
that it leverages its parent companies’ extensive networks 
and infrastructure to help them. At the same time, however, 
no matter what the brand of the company, big companies are 
generally viewed as slow moving and bureaucratic and this 
perception could then be attributed to CVCs. This, in turn, 
leads to the notion that CVCs are difficult to work with or do 
not have a vested interest in seeing the entrepreneur succeed 
because their performance has an insignificant impact on the 
parent company’s bottom line. 
The fact that there is very little to no available 
information about CVCs available also compounds the 
challenges with the reputation market. This lack of 
information makes it extremely difficult to assess what kind 
of monetary and non-monetary contributions CVCs provide. 
Under the current requirements of Regulation S-K and 
Regulation S-X, public companies that make CVC 
investments disclose the information in ways that are not 
transparent.358 For example, the information about 
corporate venture capital is referenced in the notes to 
 
358 See 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229 (2017). 
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consolidated financial statements or obliquely referenced in 
the management’s discussion and analysis or risk factors 
section. In fact, entrepreneurs may rely on the media’s 
interpretation of the limited information that is available. 
For example, in the case of Campbell Soup Company, one of 
the five case studies discussed in Section III.C supra, media 
reports largely disclosed, in the first instance, its CVC 
activity through Acre Venture Partners.359 
There are three possible ways to combat this lack of 
information about CVCs that is critical to making a 
reputational assessment. The entrepreneur should ask for 
(1) the amount of assets under management; (2) the amount 
of money that the CVCs have left to invest (i.e., dry powder); 
(3) the total number of investments (while also noting which 
ones are active); (4) how many board positions (either on the 
board or as a board observer) the investment professional of 
the CVC holds; (5) the investment preferences of the CVC 
fund; and (6) recent investments of the CVC. The 
information that this Article advocates for is already 
available—just not to everyone and not in any consistent 
manner. Resources like PitchBook are available for a fee that 
startups may not be able to afford. At the very least, 
however, entrepreneurs should seek this information in 
making decisions about potential investors when there is not 
information about them in the marketplace. In this way, the 
fifth prong of private ordering—implicit contracts regarding 
the reputation market—can be met. 
Second, the parent companies of the CVCs can voluntarily 
disclose information about their CVC activities. Although 
this type of disclosure is not required under law, it helps 
CVCs—particularly those that are not as well-known as Intel 
Capital or GV—to build a reputation for transparency. This 
transparency in turn may create a sense of trustworthiness. 
In their public company filings, the parent companies of 
CVCs may choose to include information ranging from the 
amount allocated to the CVC to which companies they are 
 
359 See discussion supra Section III.C and accompanying notes. 
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investing in to how many board seats or board observer roles 
each investment professional has. For example, in Forms 10-
K360 and 10-Q,361 the information about a public company’s 
CVC activities—whether forming a CVC or investing in 
private companies or serving on the board of a private 
company—can be made in Items I. Business and IA. Risk 
Factors. Under Item 8.01 Other Events of the Form 8-K, the 
public company may disclose “information…not otherwise 
called for by this form, that the [public company] deems of 
importance to security holders.”362 In this way, potential and 
current investors as well as employees can get a better grasp 
on what CVCs do and how big a role they play in their 
parent company. This information has the added benefit of 
being helpful to startups who may be considering 
investments from the public companies who are making CVC 
investments. 
Although not required under Regulation S-X, in the notes 
to financial statements, the parent company could break 
down equity investments in private companies in a way that 
is clear and understandable. For example, if equity 
investments are grouped under “Other Long-Term Assets,” 
which include both debt and equity investments, then that 
information needs to be broken out to describe what portion 
constitutes debt as compared to equity. In part, recently 
issued accounting pronouncements not yet adopted, such as 
Accounting Standards Update No. 2016-01 (“ASU 2016-
01”),363 may provide additional information for startups as 
well.  
 
360 See Form 10-K, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf [perma.cc/W9NL-4SWA]. 
361 See Form 10-Q, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-q.pdf [perma.cc/PX4A-6BH8]. 
362 See Form 8-K, Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf [perma.cc/72PX-ZU3Y]. 
363 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
UPDATE: RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND 
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Third, entrepreneurs seeking venture capital money can 
also perform due diligence on CVC investors through the 
venture capital fund with which they partner with. These 
funds will have knowledge of how CVC-designated board 
members act in situations where there are conflicts of 
interest if the CVC has participated in VC financings in the 
past. Even if the venture capital fund does not have such 
knowledge of the CVC, it has the ability to reach out to its 
network to get more information. 
CONCLUSION 
CVCs are playing an increasingly important role in 
venture capital financings. In order to ensure that the 
current venture capital structure works within the private 
ordering framework, CVCs may need to assess what aspects 
of venture capital funds they wish to adapt to and which 
parts of their role in the venture capital investing cycle will 
remain uniquely theirs. 
The fourth wave of CVC is not over yet. As the newest 
CVCs mature it would be helpful to look at their impact on 
private ordering over a longer time period. In particular, this 
Article urges that any future study of CVCs examine how 
CVC board designees address conflicts of interest. As this 
Article has suggested, CVCs and their parent companies 
must strive to institute a set of best practices that will better 
serve the private companies they invest in and lead to more 
productive relationships with the venture capital funds with 
which they invest.  
 
FINANCIAL LIABILITIES (2016), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/ 
DocumentPage?cid=1176167762170 [perma.cc/4C2F-R3A2]. 
